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Trade of Dierentiated Goods:Heterogeneity of Consumers,
Love of Quality and Quantity,and the Vertical Trade
Thesis directed by Professor James R. Markusen
Existing studies have found that the opening of trade results in the price-decreasing competition
among horizontally dierentiated goods and the quality upgrade of vertically dierentiated goods,
which results in the replacement of low-quality goods by high-quality goods. This paper spotlights
what existing studies have overlooked and challenges these conventional results. First, this paper
challenges the price decreasing competition by focusing on the heterogeneity of consumers. If each
consumer has his own ideal good and the price elasticity of demand decreases with the distance
from his ideal good, the opening of trade followed by the increase in the number of goods gives rms
a chance to sell its product intensively to closer and less price elastic consumers. Facing lower price
elastic consumers, rms will raise their prices after trade, and the price increasing competition is a
result.
In these days, we sometimes observe that high-quality goods from developed countries are
replaced by low-quality goods from developing countries, which contradicts with predictions of
conventional studies of vertically dierentiated goods. One reason why conventional studies cannot
show the replacement of high-quality goods is because most studies use a Unit-Demand (UD) model.
The model implicitly assumes that consumers care the quality of goods but not the quantity of
it. Without the volume eect, it less likely that inexpensive low-quality goods, which attract
consumers with quantity rater than quality beat high-quality goods. This paper uses a new Non
UD model, which relaxes the assumption of the UD and shows that producers of low-quality goods
steal consumers from producers of high-quality goods if the income gap between two countries is
iii
large enough.
Besides the UD assumption, another reason why existing studies predict the quality upgrade
after trade is because they assume that consumers value quality so much that the utility value of
the added quality always exceeds the cost of it. This paper relaxes the assumption and considers
a case where the utility increases with quality at a decreasing rate. With severe concave utility
function, numerical examples show that expensive high-quality goods from a developed country are
replaced by inexpensive low-quality goods from a developing country.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
I When Firms Meet Ideal Consumers
-Trade of Horizontally Dierentiated Goods in the Presence of Heterogeneous Consumers-
Motivations and Research Questions Existing studies in international trade have found
that the opening of trade brings countries more varieties of horizontally dierentiated goods, stim-
ulates the competition, and consequently leaves rms no room to increase their price, which is the
non-surprising conclusion of most existing studies. 1 However, existing studies reach this conclusion
by overlooking another change brought by trade: trade changes consumers to whom rms sell their
products. This paper analyzes the forgotten change in the consumers' side by using the simplied
Helpman model (1981), where each consumer has a dierent ideal good and the price elasticity of
demand depends on the distance between the ideal good and the nearest available good.
Main Results and Contributions In my model, the price consumers face increases with
the distance between their ideal goods and the good actually sold in the economy, and the price
elasticity of demand increases with price. Close consumers, whose ideal goods are close to the good
they actually buy have a lower price elasticity of demand than remote consumers do. With this
heterogeneity, an increase in the number of rms after trade gives each rm a chance to sell its
1Horizontally dierentiated goods are dierentiated based on characteristics of products such as color, while
vertically dierentiated goods are dierentiated based on the quality of products.
1
product intensively to closer and less price-elastic consumers. Facing lower aggregate price elasticity
of demand, rms increase their price after trade. That is, when rms face less price elastic ideal
consumers, prices can increase after trade. My paper is not the rst paper to show the price-
increasing competition: Chen and Riordan (2008) show it in their original model. A contribution
of my paper is that it shows the price-increase result can happen in a common ideal-core approach
model if the forgotten heterogeneity of consumers is focused.
II Love of Quantity and Quality
-A Non-Unit Demand Model of Trade on Vertically Dierentiated Goods-
Motivations and Research Questions Nowadays, we sometimes hear the news that well-
known companies of producing high quality products go out of business. These companies are
often said to exit the market because of low quality but inexpensive imports from developing
countries.(the Wal-mart eect) This anecdote suggests that a replacement of superiors by inferiors
- high quality goods in developed countries are replaced by low quality imports from developing
countries - may be happening now. However, existing theoretical models do not provide satisfactory
explanation for this replacement of superiors by inferiors. A typical result is that trade liberalization
should result in quality upgrading in equilibrium. One reason why the replacement of superiors
by inferiors has not been shown by previous studies is because most of these studies assume the
unit demand: each consumer buys at most one unit of a product regardless of his income. This
assumption presumes that consumers love quality but not quantity and limits the favorable eect
of low price on low quality goods. Alternatively, this paper presents a new non-unit demand model,
where consumers love quantity as well as quality.
Main Results and Contributions Adding consumers' love of quality into the model, this
paper shows that the rm producing the high quality goods will lose its customers and prots
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after trade, while the rm producing the low quality goods will steal customers and gain prots
if the income gap between two countries distribution is large enough to make the volume eect
of inexpensive low-quality goods work. Although the conventional unit demand model can also
show that the rm producing high-quality goods lose prots after trade because of the increase
in the competition, the non-unit demand model in this paper shows that the rm producing the
high-quality goods lose prots not only because the increase in the competition but also because
their customers are stolen by the rm producing the low-quality goods.
III: Consumer Utility and the Replacement of Superiors by Inferiors in the
Quality-ladder Model -Anti-Schumpeterian Results in the Schumpeterian Model-
Motivations and Research Questions Innovations improve the quality of goods. In the
process of innovations, we observe that high quality goods drive out low quality goods. However,
in these days, we can also observe the opposite in the developed country: high quality goods in
developed countries exit the market, while lower-quality yet inexpensive imports from developing
countries enter the market and attract consumers in the developed country. The question is how
and why these lower quality imports can drive out higher quality goods now. Chapter 2 answers this
question by focusing on the consumers' love of quantity, while this chapter answers the same ques-
tion by using a resource-consuming quality ladder model: the innovation requires more resources,
while the utility of consumers increase with the product quality at a decreasing rate.
Main Results and Contributions The concavity of consumer utility plays little role under
the autarky, and a typical Shumpeterian creative destruction takes place. Without trade, only
expensive high-quality goods are in the developed country, while only inexpensive low-quality goods
are in the developing country. However, once these two countries start free trade, the concavity
of consumer utility functions aect the survival of rms. If the consumer utility increases with
3
the quality at a severely decreasing rate, the replacement of superiors by inferiors can be realized:
rms producing high-quality expensive goods in the developed country can be extinguished by
rms producing low-quality inexpensive goods in the developing country. With the strictly concave
consumer utility function, all rms in the developed country except the rm producing the highest
quality goods exit the market if a least developed country is a trade partner, while all rms in the
developed country exit the market if a middle developed country is a trade partner.
4
Chapter 2
When Firms Meet Ideal Consumers
-Trade of Horizontally Dierentiated Goods in the Presence of Heterogeneous Consumers-
2.1 Introduction
Existing studies in international trade have found that the opening of trade brings countries more
varieties of horizontally dierentiated goods, stimulates the competition, and consequently leaves
rms no room to increase their price", which is the non-surprising conclusion of most existing
studies. 1 However, existing studies reach this conclusion by overlooking another change brought by
trade: trade changes consumers to whom rms sell their products. This paper analyzes the forgotten
change in the consumers' side by using the simplied Helpman model (1981), where each consumer
has a dierent ideal product and the price elasticity of demand depends on the distance between
the ideal good and the nearest available good. In the model, the price consumers face increases
with the distance between their ideal goods and the good actually sold in the economy. If the price
elasticity of demand increases with price(distance), consumers, whose ideal goods are closer to the
good actually sold in the economy, have a lower price elasticity of demand than remoter consumers.
1Horizontally dierentiated goods are dierentiated based on characteristics of products such as color, while
vertically dierentiated goods are dierentiated based on the quality of products.
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With the heterogeneity of consumers, an increase in the number of rms after trade gives each rm
a chance to sell its product intensively to closer and less price-elastic consumers, and the aggregate
price elasticity of demand after trade decreases. Facing lower aggregate price elasticity of demand,
rms increase their price after trade. That is, when rms face less price elastic ideal consumers,
equilibrium prices can increase. This paper is not the rst paper to predict the price-increasing
competition. Chen and Riordan (2008) focus two potentially opposite eects, the price discounting
eect called the market share eect and the price raising eect called the price sensitivity eect and
derive conditions that the price increasing eect the competition increases price when the market
structure changes from monopoly to duopoly, and the key to their result is the joint distribution
of consumer valuation for two products. My paper focuses the heterogeneity of consumers with
respect to price elasticity of demand as a result of the dierence in ideal products, and shows that
the price-increasing competition will be the result if the price elasticity of demand increases with
price(distance). In spite of the price increase, it shows that consumer welfare increases with the
trade liberalization.
The simplied Helpman model(1981) with specic functional forms is presented in section 4.2.
My original work, the eect of heterogeneous consumers on the open economy under two approaches
are discussed in section 2.3.
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2.2 The Simplied Helpman Model (1981)
The Closed Economy
The Economy, Industries, and Horizontally Dierentiated Goods
Consider a country where two types of goods, the composite of homogeneous goods(=numeraire
goods) Y and horizontally dierentiated goods X, are produced. 2 Both goods are produced by
using labor only. The labor force of size L is supplied inelastically by consumers. Consumers are
identical except that each of them has a dierent taste for horizontally-dierentiated goods: every
consumer has his own ideal horizontally-dierentiated good, which is shown as a single point on
the circumference of the circle in gure 2.1. The circumference of the circle in gure 2.1 shows all
possible goods consumers can dream of and all possible goods the country can produce potentially.
The circumference of the circle is assumed to be 2r = 2.3 Moreover, consumers' ideal goods
are presumed to be uniformly distributed on the circumference of the circle, and accordingly, the
number of consumers at each point of the circumference of the circle becomes n = L2 .
j
j-1
j+1
j-4
Figure 2.1: The Product Circle of Horizontally Dierentiated Goods
2This paper simplied the Helpman model(1981) (based on the Lancaster model (1980)) by following ways: (1)
The general homothetic utility function used in the Helpman model is changed to the stronger quasi-linear utility
function, which yields the linear demand function. (2) Only one factor of production, labor, is used in this paper,
while two factors of production, capital and labor, are used in the Helpman model.
3The radius of the circle is assumed to be r 

.
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Aside form the heterogeneous taste for horizontally-dierentiated goods, all consumers are iden-
tical: every consumer is endowed with one unit of labor, supplies one unit of labor inelastically,
owns equal shares in domestic rms, and has the same following utility function.
U(y; x^) = y + x^  1
2
x^2 (2.1)
where yi denotes the consumption of homogeneous goods and x^i the consumption of his ideal
horizontally-dierentiated goods.
Suppose that a consumer buys a non-ideal dierentiated good (k). He will get lower utility
than he will get from a unit of his ideal good (j). To put it another way, to achieve the same
utility a unit of his ideal good (j) gives, he needs more than one unit of the non-ideal good. As the
distance between the non-ideal good (k) and his ideal good increases, he needs the non-ideal good
more to achieve the same utility a unit of his ideal good gives. This is the idea of the Lancaster's
compensation function in gure 2.2. The Lancaster's compensation function (h(v)) shows how
many non-ideal goods is necessary to compensate a consumer for giving up one unit of his ideal
good.
h(v)
v                                             
Distance 
from the ideal good
1
h(v)=ɣv+1
Figure 2.2: Lancaster's Compensation Function
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The Lancaster's compensation function satises the following properties:
h(0) = 1 4
h0(v)  0 8 v > 0
In words, these properties assume that the necessary amount of the non-ideal good (k) to
compensate a consumer for giving up one unit of his ideal good increases with the distance (v).
With this compensation function, the consumer's preference is well dened, and every dier-
entiated good(k), which locates at a distance of v from the ideal good can be converted into the
equivalent ideal good (x^) units. That is,
x^ =
xk(v)
h(v)
It should be noted that the Lancaster's compensation function also determines each consumer's
eective price of his ideal product, pkh(v): if a consumer pays pk for one unit of the good k, he
will get the equivalent of 1h(v) units his ideal products. Hence, one unit of his ideal product costs
pxh(v), which implies that the further the distance from the ideal product, the higher the eective
price of the ideal product becomes.
To simplify the analysis, this paper species the Lancaster's compensation function as follows:
h(v) = v + 1 (2.2)
where  > 0
Consumer's Problem- Two-Stage Maximization Problem-
Every consumer faces the two-stage maximization problem. In the rst stage, each consumer allo-
cates his income between homogeneous goods (y) and the ideal horizontally dierentiated good (x).
4h(0) = 1 means that if the good is the ideal good, 1 unit is necessary to achieve the same utility from 1 unit of
the ideal good
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Given the allocated income, in the second stage, each consumer chooses one variety of dierentiated
goods he is going to buy. As discussed later, the variety of dierentiated goods actually produced
in the economy is nite, while the consumer's ideal variety is innite.5 Accordingly, except by
coincidence, consumers cannot buy their exact ideal goods. In such a case, each consumer do its
best he can do: he buys only one variety of the dierentiated good with the lowest eective price
(pjh(v)).
First, given the utility function (4.8), the rst-stage maximization problem is expressed as
follows.
maxU(y; x^) = y + x^  1
2
x^2
s.t. y + pxh(v)x^ = w
where x^ =
xj(v)
h(v) is the consumption of dierentiated goods converted into ideal good units.
Using the budget constraint, the consumption of y is expressed as y = w   pj x^. With this
expression, the rst-stage maximization problem is rewritten as
max U (y; x^) = w   pxh(v)x^+ x^  1
2
x^2
The First Order Condition (FOC) with respect to x^ gives the individual demand for the dier-
entiated good j.
x^ =
xj(v)
h(v)
= (  pjh(v))
Let the vertically dierentiated good the consumer i chooses in the second-stage is xj , the
5There is an innite number of products on the circle in gure 2.1.
10
individual demand of the good xij is given by
xij(v) = h(v)(  pjh(v)) (2.3)
The above demand function is a downward-sloping linear demand function.
@xij(v)
@pj
=  h(v)2 @
2xij(v)
@p2j
= 0
With this downward-sloping demand function, the price elasticity of demand  is given by:
(v) =
pjh(v)
  pjh(v) (2.4)
The price elasticity of demand in eq (2.4) implies that
0(v) =
h0(v)
(  pjh(v))2 > 0 (2:4
0)
Eq (2.4') shows that the price elasticity of demand increases with the distance between the
consumer i's ideal good and the good of the lowest eective price xj .
6 It suggests that among
all consumers of the good j, remote consumers are more price elastic than close consumers under
this linear demand function, which seems reasonable. For, among all consumers of the good j,
the remotest consumers of the good j are the closest consumers of rival goods, while the closest
consumers of the good j are the remote consumers of rival goods.
Given the above demand and the income allocated to each good (pjx(v)=pjh(v)( pjh(v)); y=w pjx(v)),
consumers choose the dierentiated good of the lowest eective price (pjh(v)) in the second stage.
In this second stage, who buys each dierentiated good is determined. Specically, consumers
within a distance of v 2 [; ] buy the good j. (gure 2.3) Marginal consumers with a distance of
 or  are indierent between the good j and the rival good j-1 or j+1.
6If the demand function is concave rather than linear, the price elasticity of demand increases with distance in
some range, while it decreases with distance in other ranges.
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good
 j-1
vj-1 vj+1
δ δgood
   j
good
 j+1
Figure 2.3: Market Share of the Good j
Precisely, marginal consumers with a distance of  are indierent between the good j and the
good j-1 because both goods oer them the same eective price (ph(v)):
pjh() = pj 1h(vj 1   ) (2.5)
where vj 1 is the distance between the good j and the good j-1.
Solving the eq (2.5) by using the special functional form h(v) = v2+1, we get the lower market
limit of the good j.
 =
pj 1
pj + pj 1
vj 1   pj   pj 1
 (pj + pj 1)
(2.6)
If pj = pj 1,  =
vj 1
2
Similarly, the upper market limit of the good j () is derived by identifying marginal consumers
who face the same eective price of the good j and the good j+1:
pjh() = pj 1h(vj+1   ) (2.7)
where vj+1 is the distance between the good j and the good j+1.
The solution of the eq (2.7) gives the upper market limit of the good j.
12
 =
pj+1
pj + pj+1
vj+1   pj+1   pj
 (pj + pj+1)
(2.8)
If pj = pj+1,  =
vj+1
2
Given the lower and the upper market limit of the good j, the aggregate demand is given by
Qj = n
(Z 
0
h(v)(  pjh(v))dv +
Z 
0
h(v)(  pjh(v))dv
)
(2.9)
n = L2 is the density of consumers at each point of the circumference of the circle.
The aggregate price elasticity of demand the rm j faces is given by
j =
(Z 
0
s(v)(v)dv +
Z 
0
s(v)(v)dv
)
  s()pj

@
@pj

  s()pj

@
@pj

(2.10)
where s(v)  nx(v)Qj denotes the share of demand from consumers with a distance of v.
As shown in eq (2.10), the aggregate price elasticity consists of two parts: the weighted average of
the individual price elasticity of demand (the rst term) and the impact of price on the upper and
the lower market limit (the second and the third term).
Since remote consumers are more price elastic than close consumers, the rst term, the weighted
average of the price elasticity of individual demand increases(decreases) as the rm covers remoter
(closer) consumers. The second and the third term, the impact of price on the upper and the lower
market limit also increases with the distance from the consumer's ideal goods unless the slope of
the Lancaster's compensation function h0(v) is close to zero and the distance plays no important
role in product dierentiation. If the slope of the Lancaster's compensation function is close to
zero and the distance between two goods plays no role in product dierentiation, the second and
the third term in eq (2.10) approaches innity, every rm will face the innite elasticity of
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demand, and accordingly the perfect competition will be the result. Otherwise, the aggregate
price elasticity of demand increases (decreases) as the rm covers remoter (closer) consumers.7
Using eq(2.5), eq (2.7), and eq (2.3), the aggregate price elasticity of demand is rewritten as
follows:
j =

npj
Qj
( Z 
0
h(v)2dv +
Z 
0
h(v)2dv
!
+

s()h()
 (pj + pj 1)
+
s()h()
 (pj + pj+1)
)
(2.10')
Firms
In the economy, two industries, the homogeneous good (y) industry and horizontally-dierentiated
goods(x) industry produce goods by using labor. A homogeneous good (=the numeraire good) is
produced with the constant returns to scale technology: one unit of labor produces one unit of the
homogeneous good. Therefore, the wage rate is xed at 1 (w=1). On the other hand, the other
type of goods, horizontally-dierentiated goods are produced with the increasing returns to scale
technology. The cost function is C(Qj) = cQj + f where c is the constant marginal cost, and f is
the xed cost. All rms producing dierentiated goods share the same production technology and
the production function. Each rm in the dierentiated good industry faces a two-stage game. In
the rst stage, the rm decides whether or not enter the market, and then, if it decides to enter
the market, it chooses the dierentiated good it is going to produce (=the location of the product
in the product circle). In deciding the location of the product, the rm does not know that it will
face free trade in the future. After deciding the location of the product, in the second stage, all
rms join the Bertrand competition: they choose price simultaneously given other rms' prices.
7Using eq(2.5), eq (2.7), the impact of price on the upper and the lower market limit are
@
@pj
=  h()
h0()(pj+pj 1)
=  h()
(pj+pj 1)
; @

@pj
=  h(
)
h0()(pj+pj+1)
=  h(
)
(pj+pj+1)
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Given the location of the product and the aggregate demand eq(2.9), in the second stage, each
rm maximizes the following prot function with respect to price.
j = n(pj   c)
(Z 
0
h(v)(  pjh(v))dv +
Z 
0
h(v)(  pjh(v))dv
)
  f (2.11)
where c is the marginal cost of production and f is the xed cost (sunk cost).
The F.O.C with respect to price gives us the familiar expression.
pj =

j
j   1

c (2.12)
This expression (2.12) shows that a rm sets its price higher than the marginal cost, and the
aggregate price elasticity of the demand is the key to determine the price.
In the rst stage, each rm decides the location of the product without knowing that it will face
free trade in the future.
Dierentiating the prot function (2.11) with respect to vj 1 (the distance from two rival rms)
gives the optimal location.
(pj   c) @Qj
@vj 1
= 0 (2.13)
Since a rm sets price higher than the marginal cost [eq (2.12)], the above equation (2.13) implies
that a rm chooses the midpoint from its two rival rms, at which a small change in the location
does not change the aggregate demand

@Qj
@vj 1 = 0

.
The Closed Economy Equilibrium
Since all rms of horizontally dierentiated goods face exactly the same maximization problem,
all rms set the same price pj = pj 1 = pj+1 8 j, and accordingly, the upper and the lower
limit of the market are the half distance from the rival rm  =  =
vj 1
2 =
vj+1
2 . Moreover, rms
spread equally over the circumference of the product circle, and the distance between any two
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rms becomes 2N (2= the length of the circumference of the circle and N is the number of
products produced in the economy).
Using the special functional forms (the utility function (4.8) and the Lancaster's compensation
function (2.2)), we get the equilibrium autarky price of the dierentiated good j.
pAU =
 B +pB2   4AD
2A
(2.14)
where A  33 + 322 + 3   3
B  3+ c  33 + 322 + 3 + 3
D   3c  1 + 22
 =  =
vj 1
2 =

N
Using eq(2.11) and eq(2.14), we have the prot of a rm in sector X.
AU =
2n (pAU   c) 22pAU3 + 3 (  2pAU) 2 + 6 (  pAU) 	
6
= 0 (2.15)
Zero prot condition Eq(2.15) and Eq (2.14) determine the autarky equilibrium price and the
number of rms.
Figure 2.4 shows the equilibrium number of goods when exogenous variables are given as follows:
8
L = 100; c = 1  = 5 ) h(v) = 5v2 + 1, and
 = 1000 ) x(v) = h(v)(1000  ph(v)) = (5v + 1) f1000  pAU(5v + 1)g
Figure 2:4 shows that the number of rms decreases with the xed cost (f= horizontal axis).
Once the equilibrium price and the number of rms are determined, the aggregate consumer
utility under autarky and the welfare can be calculated:
8Specically speaking, the number of rms shown in the gure is the maximum number of rms at which every
rm earns non-negative prot. That is this paper faces the integer problem. Since consumers own equal shares in
rms, prots earned by horizontally dierentiated goods is distributed to consumers. Consumers spend dividends on
numeraire goods.(consumers' utility function is quasi-linear and there is no income eect on dierentiated goods.)
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Figure 2.4: Number of Firms under Autarky
UAU = N

2n
Z 
0

w +
1
2
 
  pAU(v2 + 1)2 dv (2.16)
where w denotes the labor income (w = 1)
The welfare under autarky is given by
WAU = UAU +NAU (2.17)
Numerical Examples: Autarky
The following table shows the autarky equilibrium when L = 100; c = 1  = 5 ) h(v) = 5v + 1,
 = 1000 (the reservation price), and f = 1; 200; 000 Given these exogenous variables, the zero
prot condition and the price equation (2.14) determine the equilibrium number of rms and the
equilibrium price are determined by the zero prot condition and the price equation: N = 8 and
pAU = 9:12 respectively. Substituting these variables back to eq (2.11),(2.16), and (2.17), we get
the following prot, the aggregate utility of consumers and the welfare under autarky. The
average eective price (=the average unit price of the ideal good) ph(v) = 151.55 shows that the
good consumers buy under autarky is far from their ideal one.
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Autarky
N p
ph(v)
average
eective price 
Consumers'
utility Welfare
8 9.12 151.55 155,732 36,331,300 37,577,200
Note:  < 0 if N = 9
Average Eective Price= ph(v) =
 
1
L
 N  Z 
0
n  ph(v)dv +
Z 
0
n  ph(v)dv
!
| {z }
aggregate effective price
2.3 The Open Economy
Suppose that two countries suddenly start free trade. These two countries are exactly the same
except horizontally-dierentiated goods they produce under autarky.(gure 2.5) The opening of
trade brings changes to these countries:it doubles the market size (n! 2n) and the number of
products(N ! 2N). Moreover, trade changes rival rms each domestic rm locally compete with.
After the opening of trade, two rival rms, change from two domestic rms (j   1; j + 1) to two
foreign rival rms(j   1; j + 1), which produce more similar products to the good j than two
domestic rival rms. As shown in gure 2.5, except by coincidence, the distance between any two
products is not equal any longer: the distance from one foreign rival rm (j + 1) is closer than
the distance from the other foreign rival rm (j   1).
The following sections discuss the impact of the above-mentioned changes on two countries under
two dierent assumptions. First, I discuss the case with zero cost of relocation (=the cost of
changing products) (the exible location equilibrium). Second, I discusses the opposite case with
an innite cost of relocation (the sticky location equilibrium). In both cases, I discuss a short-run
two-stage game without new entry or exit as well as a long-run three-stage game with new entry
or exit.
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In the two-stage short-run game, incumbent rms re-decide the location of their product and how
far they move in the rst stage. Then, in the second stage, incumbent rms set prices
simultaneously. [the short-run Bertrand equilibrium]
In the two-stage long-run game, incumbent rms decide whether or not stay in the market and
relocate their position if necessary, while new entrants decide whether or not enter the market
and choose the location of their goods. Then, in the second stage of the long-run game, all rms
set prices simultaneously. [the long-run Bertrand equilibrium]
Autarky
Trade
j
j-1 j+1
j-2
j+1*
j+2*j-2*
j-1*
j j+1*
j+2*
j+1
j-2*
j-1*
j-1
j-2
Home
Foreign
Figure 2.5: The Opening of Trade
Case I: Zero Relocation Cost
The Short-Run Equilibrium (with no new entry or exit)
If the cost of relocation is zero, what horizontally-dierentiated goods were produced under autarky
[the location of dierentiated goods] has no importance at all. Furthermore, the asymmetry between
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the distance from one foreign rm (vj 1) and the one from another rm (v

j+1) does not cause any
problem. For, thanks to zero cost of relocation, rms change their location (products) so as to
regain the equidistance from two rival rms in the rst stage of the short-run game.[suggested by
eq (2.13)] In the short run with no new entrant, the distance between the rm (j) and its closest
rival rm (vj 1 or v

j+1) is

N , which is a half of the autarkic distance (vj 1 = vj+1 =
2
N ). After
regaining the equal interval between any two rms, all incumbents choose price simultaneously
in the second stage of the short-run game. In this stage, rms face only two changes from their
autarkic situation: the double number of consumers (2n) and the halved distance from the rival
rms (vj 1 = vj+1 = 2N ). The maximization problem of incumbents in such a circumstance is
given by
maxj = 2n(pj   c)
(Z 
0
h(v)(  pjh(v))dv +
Z 
0
h(v)(  pjh(v))dv
)
(2.18)
The FOC with respect to pj yields the same expression as eq(2.12).
pj =

j
j   1

c (2.19)
Since all incumbents are in the same situation and face the same maximization problem, they
choose the same price. As a consequence, the upper and the lower market of any dierentiated
good are still symmetric and become the midpoint of two rms. ( =  = 2N ) Compared with the
upper and the lower market limits under autarky (AU = AU = N ), the upper and the lower market
limits after trade is shortened by half. These minor changes causes a big change in the economy.
As discussed previously [eq(2.10)], the aggregate price elasticity of horizontally dierentiated goods
-the weighted average of individual price elasticity of demand plus the impact of price on the
upper and the lower market limit- decreases(increases) as a rm sells its product to closer(remoter)
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consumers. 9 Using ( =  = 2N ) and the symmetry of the upper and the lower market limit, eq
(2.10) and (2.10') , we have the new price elasticity of demand after trade.
j = 2
(Z 
2N
0
s(v)i(v)dv   s ( 2N ) pj

@
@pj
)
= 2
(Z 
2N
0
s(v)i(v)dv
)
+
s ( 
2N
)h ( 
2N
)
h0 ( 
2N
)
= 2
(Z 
2N
0
s(v)i(v)dv
)
+
s ( 
2N
)h ( 
2N
)

(2.20)
where s(v)  2nx(v)Qj the share of demand from consumers of a distance of v
The eq (2.20) suggests that if the distance from the closest foreign rival rms


2N

is suciently
large enough ( 6= 0), the slope of Lancaster's compensation is not zero, and goods are dierentiated
( 6= 0), the aggregate price elasticity of demand after trade will decrease, and accordingly rms
will INCREASE their prices (!). Firms can increase their price because they sell their products
to less price elastic closer consumers than they did under autarky. That is, when rms meet
ideal consumers -less price elastic closer consumers-, they increase their price as long as consumers
consider their products as suciently dierentiated from their rivals' products (h0 ( 
2N
) =  > 0).
The short-run exible location equilibrium without new entry or exit is given as follows:
p =
 B +pB2   4AD
2A
(2.21)
where
9If the distance between rms is close to zero and two goods become homogeneous, the impact of price on the
upper and the lower limit becomes innite, and consequently rms face the innite price elasticity of demand.[The
Bertrand competition of two homogeneous goods.] This paper will not discuss such a case.
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A  33 + 322 + 3   3
B  3+ c  33 + 322 + 3 + 3
D   3c  1 + 22
 =  =
vj 1
2 =

2N
The expression of the equilibrium price in (2.21) and that under autarkyeq(2.14) are exactly
the same. The only dierence between the post-trade short-run equilibrium price and the autarky
price is the upper and the lower market limit ( =  = 2N ).
Dierentiating the equilibrium price (2.21) or eq(2.14) with respect to the market width (),
we get the following expression.
@pj
@
=
3(1+)[ 3(1+)(E+3)(2c2+32) c(E 3)fE+22(+3)+15g+3(1+)(+2c)
p
f3+(E+3)cg2+12c(1+)2(E 3)

]
2(E 3)2
p
f3+(E+3)cg2+12c(1+)2(E 3)
(2.22)
where E  33 + 322 + 3
Eq (2.22) shows that
@pj
@ < 0 and price must increase as the market width becomes narrower if
the slope of the Lancaster's compensation function  is suciently large and the market width is
not too close  >> 0.10
Using eq(2.18) , eq(2.21) and the short-run number of rms 2N , we get the short-run prot of
an incumbent rm.
 =
4n (p  c) 22p3 + 3 (  2p) 2 + 6 (  p) 	
6
(2.23)
where  = 2N
10lim!0
@pj
@
= 0,lim!0
@pj
@
= 0
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The consumers' utility and welfare in this short-run exible location equilibrium are
U = 2N
"
2n
Z 
2N
0

w +
1
2
 
  p(v + 1)2 dv# (2.24)
W = U +N   (2.25)
The numerical example of this short-run exible location case (table 2.2, the second row) sup-
ports the above argument: Incumbents take advantage of ideal consumers- closer and less price
elastic consumers- and raise its price after trade. (9.12 to 12.64) Although an increase in prices, the
utility of consumers increase because the double number of dierentiated goods make consumers
buy goods closer to their ideal goods: the average eective price [ph(v)] decreases. (151.6 to 111.37).
On the other hand, incumbent rms lose revenue after trade (1,355,730 to 1,101,740) due to the
fact that the double-sized market cannot stop their sales decrease (167,045 to 98,988). Despite the
revenue decrease, a large increase in the consumer utility is sucient enough to increase the social
welfare. (37,577,200 to 48,460,100)
The Long-Run Equilibrium with Zero Relocation Cost
In the long run, incumbent rms may exit the market or new rms may enter the market. The
long run equilibrium is the solution of a two-stage game. In the rst stage, incumbent rms decide
whether or not stay in the market and decide how much they move from their current position, while
new rms decide whether or not enter the market and they choose the location of their products.
In the second stage, both incumbents and new entrants decide their prices simultaneously.
With zero cost of relocation,incumbents relocate their position to make distance between any
two rms to be equal. 2N to

~N
[where ~N = 2N+new entrants ].
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Flexible Location (Zero Relocation Cost)
N p
ph(v)
average
eective price Revenue
Consumer
utility Welfare
Autarky 8 9.12 151.55 1,355,730 36,331,300 37,577,200
Short-Run
Long-Run 16 12.64 111.4 1,101,740 39,646,200 48,460,100
Table 2.1: Numerical Examples with Zero Relocation Cost
Eq (2.21) and the following zero prot condition determines the number of rms and the price
in the long run.
j = 4n(pj   c)
(Z 
~N
0
h(v)(  pjh(v))dv
)
  f = 0
Once the number of rms and the long-run price are determined, revenue(prots),the utility of
consumers, and welfare are determined in the same way as the short-run equilibrium. The numerical
example (table 2.2, the third row) shows the long-run equilibrium in this exible location case.11
Since incumbent rms cannot earn enough prot to cover the entry cost f , no new rm enter the
market, and the short-run equilibrium becomes the long-run equilibrium.
Note:
Average Eective Price= ph(v) =
 
1
L
 N  Z 
0
n  ph(v)dv +
Z 
0
n  ph(v)dv
!
| {z }
aggregate effective price
Case II:Innite Relocation Cost
This section discusses the impact of trade under the assumption that the cost of relocation (=
the cost of changing characteristics of products) is innite. If the cost of relocation is innite, the
11Table 2.2 shows the long-run equilibrium by using the same exogenous variables as other numerical examples:
L = 100; c = 1  = 5 ) h(v) = 5v2 + 1,  = 1000 (the reservation price), and f = 1; 200; 000.
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location incumbent rms have chosen under autarky and the dierence between incumbent rms
with pre-established location and new rms without any pre-established location play an important
role. This section numerically shows that if two countries have developed similar products under
autarky and the left-side market width and the right-side one becomes asymmetric, the asymmetry
brings favorable eects to rms, while the asymmetry brings less favorable eects to consumers.
If no rm enters the market, and no rm relocates its position, the opening of trade gives every
incumbent rm a chance to receive benet from less price elastic close consumers as well as the sales
increase due to the double-sized market. Since rms raise their price after trade and the innite
relocation cost prevents rms to move closer to the ideal goods of every consumer, the consumer
utility may deteriorate after trade in the extreme asymmetry case.
The Short-run Equilibrium with No New Entry or Exit
In the short run without new rms, all rms in the economy are incumbent rms of pre-established
products. All incumbent rms (2N rms) are in the same situation as shown in gure 2.6. Except
by coincidence, the distance from one foreign rival rm vj+1 =
(1 )
N is closer than the distance
from the other foreign rival rm vj 1 =
(1+)
N
12
 j-1*    j  j+1*
v*j-1=(1+θ)ß/N v*j+1=(1-θ)ß/N
Figure 2.6: The Location of Firms after Trade
Since the cost of relocation is innite, no existing rm changes its product and relocate its
position in the rst stage of the short run game. Thus, the asymmetric distance between rms
hold. Given the asymmetric distance, every incumbent rm sets price simultaneously in the second
12This paper does not discuss the case where two countries have coincidentally developed exactly same products
under autarky. If two countries have coincidentally developed exactly same products under autarky, the competition
after trade will be the Bertrand competition between homogeneous goods.
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stage. Since all incumbent rms face the same maximization problem, they choose the same price.
p =


  1

c
Accordingly, the upper and the lower limit of any incumbent rm are just the half of the distance
from two close rival rms [= (1+)
2N
> =
(1 )
2N
the left market width is wider than the right one.] Given
these upper and the lower limit, the aggregate price elasticity of demand is given by
j =
Z 
0
s(v)i(v)dv +
Z 
0
s(v)i(v)dv   s () pj

@
@pj

  s () pj

@
@pj

=
Z 
0
s(v)i(v)dv +
Z 
0
s(v)i(v)dv +
s ()h ()
2h0 ()
+
s ()h ()
2h0 ()
=
Z 
0
s(v)i(v)dv +
Z 
0
s(v)i(v)dv +
s ()h ()
2
+
s ()h ()
2
(2.26)
where  = (1+)2N
 = (1 )2N
The above equation suggests that the aggregate price elasticity of demand is higher (lower) than
that under zero relocation cost if the share of sales from the narrower side of the market is large
(small).
The F.O.C. with respect to price p =


 1

c, and the aggregate price elasticity of demand eq
(2.26) when = (1+)
2N
and = (1 )
2N
, give the short-run equilibrium sticky location price. (pasy)
pasy =
 Basy +
q
(Basy)2   4AasyDasy
2Aasy
(2.27)
where Aasy   (22 + 3 + 3) + (22 + 3 + 3)	  6
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Basy  c (22 + 3 + 3) + (22 + 3 + 3)	+ 6(c+ )
Dasy   3c
n
( + 1)2 +
 
 + 1
2o
 = (1+)2N
 = (1 )2N
Figure 2.7 shows the post-trade short-run equilibrium price with an innite cost of relocation,
the post-trade short-run equilibrium price with zero cost of relocation when L = 100; c = 1
 = 5 ) h(v) = 5v + 1,  = 1000 (the reservation price),f = 1; 200; 000, and accordingly the
number of products after trade becomes 2N = 2 8.
Figure 2.7 shows a numerical example with the same exogenous variables use in previous sec-
tions. The gure shows that the post-trade short-run equilibrium price in the case of an innite
relocation cost is the highest. For, the asymmetric market width and an innite relocation cost
makes the share of sales from the narrower side of the market to be so high, and accordingly rms
set high price as if they cover the narrower side of the market only. With an innite cost of reloca-
tion, the location of products each country has established under autarky plays an important role
after trade. The Figure shows a non-monotonic relationship between the short-run price and the
asymmetry of the market width. At rst, the price increases with the asymmetry due to the fact
that the share of sales from the narrower side of the market is so high that rms put more weight
on the price elasticity of the narrower side of the market. However, as the market width becomes
more asymmetric, the share of sales from the wider side of the market becomes larger, and thus
rms care price elastic consumers in the wider side of the market and discount their price. (Figure
2.2)
Given the short-run price (pasy), prots of incumbent rms, the consumers' utility, and welfare
are given as follows.
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Figure 2.7: Autarky Price, Post-Trade Price (zero relocation cost), Post-Trade Price (innite relo-
cation cost)
asy = 2n(pasy   c)
(Z 
0
h(v)(  pasyh(v))dv +
Z 
0
h(v)(  pasyh(v))dv
)
(2.28)
Uasy = 2N

n
Z 
0

w +
1
2
 
  pasy(v + 1)2 dv + n Z 
0

w +
1
2
 
  pasy(v + 1)2 dv
(2.29)
W asy = Uasy +Nasy (2.30)
The Numerical Example: the Short-Run Sticky Location Equilibrium
Table 2.2 shows the short-run equilibrium with dierent degree of asymmetry when the relocation
cost is innite.
Table shows that the short-run equilibrium price, increases and then decreases as products of
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Figure 2.8: Share of Sales from Dierent Consumers
two countries under autarky become more similar, and the left-side market width and the right-side
one becomes asymmetric. As mentioned before, the equilibrium price depends on the share of sales
from remote consumers in the wider side of the market. Figure 2.2 shows that the share of sales
from remote consumers in the wider side of the market is less important when the width of two side
of the market is slight symmetric. As a result, rms put less weight on remote consumers, and set
high price. Since no rm can move, every rm takes advantage of less price elastic consumers and
continues to raise price with the degree of asymmetry. However, as the right-side market width and
the left-side market width becomes too asymmetric, the sales from price elastic remote consumers
in the wider side of the market becomes important, and rms have no choice but to discount their
price.
With no new entry or exit, the short-run revenue is the highest when products of two countries
under autarky are more similar and the market width becomes severely asymmetric. That is
because rms receive benets from covering less price elastic consumers and selling more products
due to the double-size market.
On the other hand, the asymmetry brings less favorable eect to consumers. the average eective
price (the third column in Table 2.2) increases as products of two countries under autarky are more
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similar and the market width becomes more asymmetric. As the table shows, if two countries have
established similar products under autarky and the two sides of the market is severely asymmetric,
the average eective price and the consumer utility after trade is lower than those under autarky.
The welfare of the economy also decreases with the degree of asymmetry. To summarize, numerical
results suggest that trading with similar countries(the asymmetric market width) brings favorable
eects to rms, while it brings unfavorable eects to consumers.
Case: Innite Relocation Cost: vj 1 =
(1 )
N v

j+1 =
(1+)
N
N p
ph(v)
average
eective price 
Consumers'
utility Welfare
Autarky 8 9.12 151.55 1,355,730 36,331,300 37,577,200
Post Trade
Perfect Symmetry  = 0 16 12.64 111.37 1,101,740 39,646,200 48,460,100
Post Trade
Slight Asymmetry  = 0:2 16 14.41 131.45 1,267,380 37,980,100 48,119,100
Post Trade
Moderate Asymmetry =0:396 16 14.78 148.39 1,376,030 36,677,100 47,685,300
Post Trade
Severe Asymmetry  = 0:47 16 14.70 154.87 1,413,160 36,191,500 47,496,800
Table 2.2: Numerical Examples:Short-Run Equilibrium with Innite Relocation Cost
2.4 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the forgotten change in the consumers' side by using the simplied Helpman
model (1981), where each consumer has a dierent ideal good and the price elasticity of demand
depends on the distance between the ideal good and the nearest available good. In my model, the
price consumers face increases with the distance between their ideal goods and the good actually
sold in the economy, and the price elasticity of demand increases with price. Close consumers,
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whose ideal goods are close to the good available in the economy, have a lower price elasticity of
demand than remote consumers. With this heterogeneity of consumers, an increase in the number
of rms after trade gives each rm a chance to sell its product intensively to closer and less price-
elastic consumers, and the aggregate price elasticity of demand after trade decreases. Facing lower
aggregate price elasticity of demand, rms increase their price after trade. That is, when rms
face less price elastic ideal consumers, equilibrium prices can increase under both cases (the exible
location case and the sticky location case). The paper thus derives a possibly counter-intuitive
result on the eect of trade liberalization on prices, though consumer welfare nevertheless increases
with liberalization (consumers closer to their ideal variety). This paper also discusses the case where
the cost of changing characteristic of products (the cost of relocation) is innite. In this case, the
location of the product developed under autarky becomes important. Numerical examples show
that the degree of asymmetry have the opposite eects on rms and consumers. Surprisingly,
trading with similar country, which creates the asymmetric market width brings favorable eects
to rms, while it brings unfavorable eects to consumers. With no new entry or exit, the short-run
revenue is the highest when products of two countries under autarky are more similar and the
market width becomes severely asymmetric. That is because rms receive benets from covering
less price elastic consumers and selling more products due to the double-size market.
On the contrary, the asymmetry brings less favorable eect to consumers. the average eective
price (the third column in Table 2.2) increases as products of two countries under autarky are more
similar and the market width becomes more asymmetric. As the table shows, if two countries have
established similar products under autarky and the two sides of the market is severely asymmetric,
the average eective price and the consumer utility after trade is lower than those under autarky.
The welfare of the economy also decreases with the degree of asymmetry. To summarize, numerical
results suggest that trading with similar countries(the asymmetric market width) brings favorable
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eects to rms, while it brings unfavorable eects to consumers.
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Chapter 3
Love of Quantity and Quality
-A Non-Unit Demand Model of Trade on Vertically Dierentiated Goods-
3.1 Introduction
Nowadays, we sometimes hear the news that well-known companies of producing high quality
products go out of business. For instance, in April 2012, Aquascutum,a UK-based luxury clothing
manufacturer,was sold to YGM Trading, a Chinese fashion retailer. These companies are often said
to exit the market because of low quality but inexpensive imports from developing countries.(the
Wal-mart eect) This anecdote suggests that a replacement of superiors by inferiors - high quality
goods in developed countries are replaced by low quality imports from developing countries - may
be happening now. However, existing theoretical models do not provide satisfactory explanation for
this replacement of superiors by inferiors. A typical result is that trade liberalization should result
in quality upgrading in equilibrium: Gabszewicz,Shaked, Sutton and Thisse (1981) predict that high
quality goods will survive, while low quality goods will exit after the opening of trade, which is
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the opposite to the replacement of superiors by inferiors. For another example, Flam and Helpman
(1987) predict that low quality goods produced in the developed country will be replaced by the
same low quality imports from developing countries, which is not the replacement of superiors by
inferiors but the horizontal replacement of superiors by inferiors (the catch-up eect). One reason
why the replacement of superiors by inferiors has not been shown in previous studies is because
most of these studies assume the unit demand: each consumer buys at most one unit of a product
regardless of his income. This assumption presumes that consumers love quality but not quantity
and limits the favorable eect of low price on low quality goods. Alternatively, this paper presents
a new non-unit demand model, where consumers love quantity as well as quality. Either the unit
demand model or non-unit demand model can show that if the income gap between two countries
is large enough, the rm producing the low-quality good in the developing country exports its
goods and gain prots, while the rm producing the high-quality good in the developed country
lose prot after trade. However, the non-unit demand model can show the consumer-stealing eect
the conventional unit demand model cannot show. In the conventional unit demand model, the
rm producing the low-quality goods exports its products to the developed country, nevertheless
it does not steal any customer from the rm producing the high-quality goods. For, they sell
their products to consumers in the developed country, who could not buy any good under autarky.
The only reason why the rm producing the high-quality goods in the developed country loses
prots after trade is because the increase in competition. On the contrary, in my model, the rm
producing the high-quality goods loses prots is not only because the competition become erce but
also because some low-income consumers in the developed country, who have bought high-quality
goods under autarky are attracted to the volume of products and switch to low-quality goods if
the income gap between two countries is large enough to make such a volume eect to work.
The non-unit demand model with endogenous quality choice is developed in section 4.2, the
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open economy non-unit model is discussed in section 3.3, and the comparison between results of
the non-unit demand model with that of the traditional unit demand model is shown in section
3.4.
3.2 A Non-unit Demand Model with Endogenous Quality Choice
Autarky
Consumers
Consumers love quantity as well as quality. The utility of consumers are assumed to be measured
by the consumer surplus (CS).
Ux  CS = sjiqj  
q2j
2
  pjqj (3.1)
where sj is the quality of the good j, qj is the quantity of good j, and i is the index of the
income of the consumer i.
P
P=sθ-q
q
P
Figure 3.1: Consumer Surplus
Maximization of the above utility function (3.1) gives the following individual demand:
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qi = sji   pj if si  p (3.2)
The individual demand qi increases with quality (sj), income (i) but decreases with price,
which is a distinct feature of this model. In the conventional unit-demand model,the aggregate
demand decrease with price but the individual demand does not decrease with the price, while the
individual demand decreases with the price in this non-unit demand model.12
The consumer surplus achieved by the individual i is
U i = CSi =
(sji   pj)2
2
(3.3)
The Firm-Monopoly-
Assume that in each country, only one rm, the monopolist, produces a vertically dierentiated
good under autarky. The monopolist faces a two-stage game. In the rst stage, the monopolist
chooses the quality of goods without knowing that it will face free trade in the future. Changing
the quality of goods is assumed to be so costly that the monopolist will not change the quality of
its products later. In the second stage, given the quality of products, the monopolist chooses the
price of the product. Unlike the quality, price can be changed without cost.
The income of consumers  are assumed to be uniformly distributed over the range  2 [; ].
3 Thus, the aggregate demand Q the monopolist faces is given as follows.
Q =
Z 

(s   p)nd (3.4)
1qi = 0 if the price is greater than the reservation price si < p
2The reservation price sji implies that given the income , consumers are willing to pay more to higher quality
goods.
3Similarly, in a foreign country, the income is uniformly distributed over the range  2 [; ].
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where  = max

; p
	
is the endogenous lower limit, which is the higher of two values, the
lowest income  or p the income of consumers whose consumer surplus is exactly zero.
n = L  is the density of consumers at each point of income distribution(L is the population
size)
The Price Choice-The Second Stage- Solving backward, in the second stage, the monopolist
sets the price. The marginal cost is normalized to be 0. The monopolist treats the lower limit of
the market as endogenous  = ps and chooses the price to maximize the following prots .
max =
Z 

p(s   p)nd   F (s) (3.5)
where F (s) is the cost of quality, which depends only on the quality and is independent of the
quantity of production. Firms must incur the cost of quality F (s) in every period.4
The FOC with respect to price is given by
 
  
2

s
 
 + 
  4p	 = 0
Using the endogenous lower limit,  = ps , the above FOC gives the optimal price.
p =
s
3
(3.6)
This equation (3.6) implies that the monopolist chooses the combination of quality and price
(ps =  =

3 ) so as to make consumers with income

3 can buy its product.
In other expressions, the market is fully covered if the income distribution is not so wide that
the highest-income consumers do not earn three times more than the lowest-income consumers do.
(  3).
4The cost of customer centers is an example of such cost.
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The market is
8>><>>:
fully covered if   3
partially covered if  > 3
The Quality Choice-The First Stage- In the rst stage, the monopolist chooses the quality of
products without knowing it will face free trade in the future. As mentioned before, changing the
quality of products is so costly, the monopolist will not change the quality later. The monopolist
chooses the quality s so as to maximizes prots in eq (3.5).
The cost of quality F (s) in eq (3.5) increases with quality,F 0(s), and the curvature of the
quality-cost function is assumed to be greater than 1 5:
F 0(s) > 0 and
s  F 00(s)
F 0(s)
> 1
In this paper, the following special functional form is used for F (s).6
F (s) =

2
s2   s+ 
2
2
(3.7)
 in the above equation is assumed to satisfy the following condition.7
 > max

4L
 


3
3
;
(+)L
6

With this cost function, the FOC with respect to quality (s) is given by8
p
2
n
 
2   2+ p(s   p)n ( @
@s
)  s+  = 0 (3.8)
5This is a necessary and sucient condition to satisfy the SOC w.r.t. quality
6F 0(s) = s   and sF
00
(s)
F
0
(s)
= s
s  > 1 under this special functional form
7This condition is a necessary and sucient condition for the SOC w.r.t quality.
8The second term in eq (3.8) is zero either because the CS of the lower limit consumers is zero (i.e. s   p = 0 )
under the fully covered market (3) or because the lower limit becomes exogenous ( =  and @
@s
=0 ) under the
partially covered market (> 3).
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The Autarky Equilibrium under (Fully Covered Market) If the income distribution
is not so wide that the highest-income consumers do not earn three times more than the lowest-
income consumers do 3, the market is fully covered and the lower limit of the market is equal
to the lowest income in the country  = . Substituting  =  into eq (3.8), we have the optimal
quality under fully covered market.
s =

  (2 
2)n
6
 (3.9)
Substituting the above eq (3.9) back to eq (3.6), we have the optimal price under fully covered
market.
p =
 
3
n
  (2 2)n
6
o (3.10)
Once the optimal price and quality are determined, the equilibrium aggregate demand and
prots can be calculated as follows.
Substituting eq (3.9) and eq (3.10) into eq(3.4), we have the equilibrium aggregate demand.
Q =
 ( ) (+3)n
6

  (
2 2)n
6
 (3.11)
Substituting eq (3.9) and eq (3.10) into eq(3.5), we have the equilibrium prots.
 =
2 (9  22L)
18
n
  (2 2)n
6
o2   22 (3.12)
The Autarky Equilibrium under the Partially Covered Market Similarly, if > 3,
the market is not fully covered and the lower limit of the market is equal to a third of the highest
income = p
s
=

3
. Substituting = 
3
into eq (3.8), we have the optimal quality under partially covered
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market.
s =
n
 4n 
3
3o (3.13)
Again substituting this optimal quality (3.13) into eq (3.6), we have the equilibrium price under
the partially covered market.
p =
 
3
n
 4n 
3
3o (3.14)
Substituting eq (3.13)and(3.14) back to eq (3.4) and (3.5), the equilibrium aggregate demand
and the equilibrium prots under the partially covered market can be derived as follows.
Q =
2 2n
9
n
 4n 
3
3o (3.15)
 =
2
2
n
 4n 
3
3o   22 (3.16)
The Closed Economy Equilibrium -Summary- To summarize, the autarky equilibrium
is characterized by the following equilibrium variables.
s =
8>>>>><>>>>>:

  (2 2)n
6
 (3:9) if   3

 4n


3
3 (3:13) if  > 3
pau =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
 
3
(
 
(2 2)n
6
) (3:10) if   3
 
3

 4n


3
3 (3:14) if  > 3
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Qau =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
( )(+3)n
6
(
 
(2 2)n
6
) (3:11) if   3
2 2n
9

 4n


3
3 (3:15) if  > 3
au =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
2(9 22L)
18
(
 
(2 2)n
6
)2   22 (3:12) if   3
2
2

 4n


3
3   22 (3:16) if  > 3
All of the above variables-s; p; Q; - increase with the highest income, the lowest income, and
the population size (;;L): it implies that the monopolist in a country with higher income and
larger population size produces higher quality goods, charges higher price, sells more products, and
earns more prots. 9
3.3 The Open Economy:Duopoly
Consider the situation where two countries-a developed country (home) and a developing country
(foreign)- start free trade. In each country, the monopolist produces vertically dierentiated goods.
Two countries have dierent income distributions and dierent population size, yet they have the
same cost function and the same utility function.
This paper considers a special case: the income distribution of two countries just touches (i.e.
=) [gure 3.2], the density of consumers is the same in both countries,(i.e. n= L =
L
 =n
),
and both markets were fully covered under autarky.(  3 in home and   3 in foreign) 10
The Post-Trade Bertrand Competition After free trade starts, two rms face the competi-
tion. Since the highest income (and the lowest income) in the developed country are higher than
9No variable faces the discontinuity problem:all variables are continuous at =3.
10With the rst two assumptions, free trade just brings the extension of income distribution from [; ] to [; ].
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[Special Case 1] Just overlaping income distribution
Θ*Θ*
Θ Θ
Developing Country
Developed Country
Figure 3.2: Income Distributions of Two Countries
those in the developing country by assumption, eq (3.9) suggests that the quality of goods produced
in the developed country is higher than that of goods produced in the developing country. (s > s)
Since the cost of changing quality is high, these two rms will not change their quality. Thus, two
rms immediately start the Bertrand competition, and they set the new price simultaneously given
the price of the other rm. In setting their prices, two rms set the same price in two markets
because the arbitrage is possible in this model.
Consumers
After trade, consumers in both countries now have choice between the high quality goods and
the low quality ones. Consumers in two countries share the same utility function, and marginal
consumers achieve the same utility level by buying either of two goods. That is,
1
2

s~   p
2
=
1
2

s~   p
2
Solving the above equation, the income of marginal consumers who are indierent between the
high quality goods and the low quality ones can be identied 11:
~ =
p  p
s  s (3.17)
If the income of marginal consumers is greater than the lowest income in the developed country(~  ),
the rm producing the low-quality goods in the developing country will export and steal consumers
11The derivation of eq (3.17) is shown in the appendix B
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from the rm producing the high-quality goods, vice versa.
Firms: The Bertrand Competition
After free trade starts, two rms join the Bertrand competition and set its price simultaneously.
Given the income of marginal consumers eq(3.17), the aggregate demand function and the prot
function are given as follows.
Q =
Z ~

(s   p) nd (3.18)
 =
Z ~

p(s   p) nd   F (s) (3.19)
where the lower boundary of the rm producing the low-quality good becomes =maxf; p
s g and
F (s) = 2 s
2   s + 22 is the cost of quality incurred in every period
The FOC with respect to price (p) gives the reaction function of the rm producing the low-
quality goods 12:
p =
sp
3s
(3.20)
The aggregate demand and the prot function of the rm producing the high-quality goods are
given by
Q =
Z 
~
(s   p) nd (3.21)
12There are two solutions for p. However, the solution in eq(3.20) is the only solution that satises the second
order condition. Appendix shows the derivation of eq (3.20).
43
 =
Z 
~
p(s   p) nd   F (s) (3.22)
where F (s) = 2 s
2 s+ 22 is the cost of quality incurred by the rm producing the high-quality
good.
The FOC with respect to price gives the reaction function of the rm producing the high-quality
goods:
p =
2

(s  s)2   sp	q4(s  s)2   sp	2   3s(s  2s)2(s  s)2   p2	
3(s  2s) (3.23)
The Open Economy Equilibrium
The intersection of two reaction functions (3.20), (3.23) yields the Nash equilibrium in this special
case.13
p =
3s(s  s) 
n
6s(s  s) 
p
9(s  s)2 + 16s2
o
27(s  s)2   16s2 (3.24)
p =
s 
n
6s(s  s) 
p
9(s  s)2 + 16s2
o
27(s  s)2   16s2 (3.25)
The income of marginal consumers is
~ =
(3s  s) 
n
6s(s  s) 
p
9(s  s)2 + 16s2
o
27(s  s)2   16s2 (3.26)
Eq (3.22)and(3.19) give the post-trade prots:
 = np(   ~)
ns
2

 + ~

  p
o
 


2
s2   s+ 
2
2

| {z }
F (s)
(3:22)
13The derivation of eq (3.24), (3.25), and (3.26) are shown in Appendix B.
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 = np(~  )

s
2

~ +

  p

 


2
s2   s + 
2
2

| {z }
F (s)
(3:19)
3.4 The Non-Unit Demand Model vs The Unit Demand Model:
Numerical Comparison
So far, this paper has discussed the original Non-Unit Demand (Non-UD) model with endogenous
quality choice. This section compares the Non-UD model with the conventional Unit Demand (UD)
model with endogenous quality choice when 2 <   3 and 2 <   3. In this income
range, autarky markets are fully covered in the Non-UD model, while they are partially covered in
the UD model. 14 15
This section numerically shows that the income gap, the dierence between the highest income
in the developed country and the lowest income in the developing country is the key in both
the Non-UD model and the UD model. Both models reach the same conclusion with regard to the
following: the rm producing the low-quality goods in the developing country exports their products
to the developed country if the income gap between two countries is large enough. However, the rm
producing the high-quality goods in the developed country exports their products to the developing
county and steal consumers from the rm producing the low-quality goods if the income gap is not
large enough. Even if the rm producing the high-quality goods exports their products, it loses
prots after trade due to the increase in competition.
Two models reach dierent results with regard to the consumer stealing eect of the rm
producing the low-quality goods. As mentioned above, both models predict that the low-quality
goods are exported to the developed country if the income gap between two countries and the income
14The income range is the only range, which allows two models to be compared meaningfully.
15The UD model with endogenous quality choice is presented in Appendix A
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distribution within a country are so wide that the low-quality goods attract some consumers in the
developed country. However, in the conventional UD model, consumers, who buy the low-quality
goods after trade have not bought any product under autarky. On the contrary, in the Non-UD
model, all consumers, who buy the low-quality goods after trade have bought the high-quality goods
under autarky. The dierent conclusion comes from the fact that the Non-UD model considers the
quantity eect as well as the price eect, while no volume eect of the low-quality good is considered
in the UD model
The Non-UD Model vs The UD Model: Exporters and the Consumer Stealing
Eect
Figure3.5 and 3.6 show the location of marginal consumers and identies the exporter of goods after
trade in two models. In both models, the income distribution is a key determinant for the trade
pattern. If the income gap between two countries and the income distribution within each country
is wide enough, the rm producing the low-quality goods in the developing country attract the
low-income consumers in the developed country and export its products to the developed country.
However, the rm producing the high-quality goods export its product to the developing country.
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Figure 3.3: Non-UD Model: Exporters of Goods
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In terms of the consumer stealing eect, two model reach the dierent conclusion. The distance
between the location of the post-trade lower limit that of the autarky lower limit in Figure 3.5
shows the consumer stealing eect in the Non-UD model. If the income gap between two countries
is not large enough, the rm producing the high-quality goods export its products to the developing
country and steal consumers from the rm in the developing country. However, if the income gap
between two countries and the income distribution within the developed country is wide enough,
the rm producing the low-quality become an exporter and steal consumers, who have bought the
high-quality goods before trade.
On the other hand, the conventional UD model tells a dierent story. The distance between
the location of the autarky lower limit and that of the post-trade lower limit drawn in Figure 3.6
shows the consumer stealing eect in the UD model. As shown, the post-trade lower limit of the
rm in the developed country is always lower than its autarky lower limit at any income diversity
level, which means that the rm producing the high-quality goods gain new consumers rather than
lose existing consumers. It also means that consumers who buy the low-quality goods after trade
are consumers who have not bought any good under autarky.
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The Non-UD Model vs The UD Model:Prots
In terms of prots, two models reach the same conclusion: the rm producing the high-quality
goods always lose prots after trade due to the increased competition, while the rm producing the
low-quality goods can gain prots by exporting its products to the developed country if the income
gap between two countries and the income distribution within the developed country is so wide
that the low-quality goods attract some low-income consumers in the developed country. (Figure
3.7, 3.8, 3.9)
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Figure 3.7: Non-UD Model:Prots of the Firm
Producing the High-Quality Goods
2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0
50
100
150
200
Post-Trade
Autarky
Income Gap
ProfitsProfits
Figure 3.8: UD Model:Prots of the Firm Pro-
ducing the High-Quality Goods
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Figure 3.9: Prots of the Firm Producing the Low-Quality Goods
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3.5 Numerical Examples
This section presents numerical examples corresponding to the discussion in the previous section.
Table 3.1 shows the case where the income gap between two countries are large. As discussed
in the previous section, two models reach dierent conclusions about the rm of low quality goods:
the rm producing low-quality goods increases prots by stealing consumers from the other rm,
while in the UD model, its post-trade prot gain without stealing any consumer. With or without
the consumer stealing eect has dierent implications from trade. As shown in gure 3.5, 3.5, 3.5,
every consumer will be better o after trade. In percentage, low-income consumers in the developed
country will get more gain from trade than high-income consumers in the same country. In value,
trade has dierent implications. If the income gap between two countries is small and no consumer
is stolen from the rm producing the high quality goods, the gain from trade monotonically in-
creases with income. However, if the income gap between two countries is large enough, and the
rm producing low quality goods steal some consumers from the other rm, the gain from trade
and income have a v-shape relationship. Marginal consumers, who are suering the most from
downgrade of their consumption will get the lowest gain from trade.
Table 3.2 shows the case where two countries are similar. As discussed in proposition ??, two
models reach the same conclusion in this case.
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Non-UD model: =135 ==50 =24:5 L=100 L=30 n=n=1:176
s s p p Q Q   w w Exporter
consumer
stealing
eect
Autarky 0:142 0:036 6:4 0:6 675 22 1135 13 4019 22
Trade 0:142 0:036 6.2 0.5 690 30 1096 15 4116 26
Low
quality YES
UD model: =135 ==50 =24:5 L=100 L=30 n=n=1:176
s s p p Q Q   w w Exporter
consumer
stealing
eect
Autarky 0:044 0:035 3 0.9 79 29 211 26
Trade 0:044 0:035 0.7 0.3 100 30 45 8
Low
quality NONE
Table 3.1: Non-UD model VS UD model: Large Income Gap Case
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The Non-UD model: =110 ==50 =32 L=100 L=30 n=n=1:67
s s p p Q Q   ~ Exporter Losers of consumers
Autarky 0.074 0:036 2.7 0.6 321 26 442 15
Trade 0.074 0:036 2.3 0.4 367 32 400 11 49.7 high quality low quality
The UD model: =110 ==50 =32 L=100 L=30 n=n=1:667
s s p p Q Q   ~ Exporter Losers of consumers
Autarky 0.043 0:036 2.4 0.9 92 42 197 37
Trade 0.043 0:036 0.5 0.2 116 30 35 2 40.52 high quality low quality
Table 3.2: The Non-UD model VS The UD model: Small Income Gap Case
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3.6 Conclusion
Observing that the unit demand model used by existing studies do not provide satisfactory expla-
nation for the replacement of superiors by inferiors, this paper presents a new alternative non-unit
demand model, where consumers love quantity as well as quality. Adding consumers' love of quality
into the model, this paper shows that the rm producing the high quality goods will always lose
prots after trade, while the rm producing the low quality goods will steal consumers from the
rm producing the high quality goods and gain prots if the income gap between two countries is
large enough to make room for the low-quality but inexpensive goods to attract consumers. As
shown above, the contribution of this paper is to propose a new non-unit demand model that can
consider consumers' love of quantity and to show that the rm producing low quality goods steal
consumers from the other rm and gains prot after trade if the income gap between two countries
is large enough. Numerical examples show that every consumer will gain from trade, yet trade will
bring consumers heterogeneous gain from trade. If the income gap between two countries is not
large enough, no consumer in the developed country changes to buy the low quality goods, the
gain from trade increase with income. However, if the income gap between two countries is large
enough, and low income consumers in the developed countries change to buy the low quality goods,
the gain from trade and the income has a v-shape relationship: for those low-income consumers
who switch to the low quality goods, the gain from trade decrease with income, while the gain from
trade increases with income for those high-income consumers who do not switch to low-quality
goods. The gain from trade of marginal consumers hits the lowest because marginal consumers will
suer the negative eect of giving up the high quality goods the most.
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Appendix A: The Traditional Unit Demand Model with the En-
dogenous Quality Choice
Most models in previous studies allow neither the endogenous quality choice nor the non-unit de-
mand, while my model allows both the non-unit demand and the endogenous once-and-all quality choice.
Therefore, dierent results between my model and models in previous studies are explained by mixed
eects of the non-unit demand and the endogenous quality choice.
To show how important the non-unit demand assumption plays in my model, this section
presents the unit demand version of my model: the model presented in this section allows the
once-and-for-all endogenous quality choice but imposes the unit demand assumption on consumers.
Consumers-The Unit Demand- First, the utility of consumers assumed in many previous
models is given by
Ui = sji   p
where i is the income of the consumer i.
The individual demand is simply given by
qi =
8>><>>:
1 if si  p
0 if si < p
The Firm-Monopoly under Autarky- Given the above individual demand, the aggregate
demand the monopolist faces is equal to the number of consumers whose income is greater than or
equal to  = ps :
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QUD =
Z 

n d = n

  p
s

(3.27)
The monopolist's prots is given by
UD = pQ 


2
ss   s+ 
2
2

| {z }
F (s)
(3.28)
The monopolist faces the two-stage game: in the rst stage, it chooses the quality without
knowing that it will face free trade in the future, and then it sets the price in the second stage. As
mentioned in previous sections, the quality choice is irreversible, while the price choice is reversible.
The Second Stage:the Price Choice In the second stage, given the quality chosen in the rst
stage, the monopolist sets price. The FOC with respect to price gives the optimal combination of
price and quality:
pUD =
s
2
(3.29)
eq (3.29) implies that under the unit demand assumtipion, the rm chooses price and quality
to make consumers with income  = ps =

2 purchase its products.
16
In other expressions, eq (3.29) implies that
The market is
8>><>>:
fully covered if   2
partially covered if  > 2
It becomes harder for the market to be fully covered under the unit demand model.
The First Stage:the Irreversible Quality Choice In the rst stage, the monopolist chooses
the quality of its product once and for all without knowing that free trade will start in the future.
16Compared eq(3.29) with (3.6), the monopolist sell its products less consumers under the unit demand model than
it does under the non-unit demand model.
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The Irreversible Quality Choice under the Fully Covered Market If the income
distribution is not so diverse (   2),as shown above, the monopolist covers the whole market.
In such a case, the lower limit becomes exogenous variable, the lowest income ( = ).
Substituting  =  into the prot function (3.28), the FOC with respect to s gives the optimal
quality.
sUD =


(3.30)
Eq(3.30) shows that the optimal quality under the exogenous lower limit is the quality, which
simply minimizes the cost of quality. This optimal quality does not depends on the income distri-
bution at all. Hence, if   2 in all countries, all country produce the same quality of goods.
The Irreversible Quality Choice under the Partially Covered Market If the income
distribution is diverse enough ( > 2),the monopolist choose the combination of price and quality
so as to make consumers with income

2 or above buy its products. In this a case, given the quality,
the monopolist treats the lower limit as endogenous variable, ( = ps ).
Substituting  = ps into eq (3.28), we get the FOC with respect to s.
sUD =

2L
 

+ 4
4
(3.31)
The optimal quality under the partially covered market shows the same characteristics as the
optimal quality under the non-unit demand model: the quality increases with the highest income,
the lowest income, and the population size but decreases with the cost of quality.17
17The optimal quality under the partially covered market is higher than the optimal quality under the fully covered
market. s =

2L
 

+4
4
> 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The Closed Economy Equilibrium under the Unit Demand Model Substituting the
optimal quality and price back to eq(3.27),(3.28), and (3.29), we get the closed economy equilibrium
under the unit demand model.
sUD =
8>><>>:

 (3:30) if   2
n2+4
4 (3:31) if  > 2
pauUD =
8>><>>:
 
2 if
  2
(n2+4)
8 if
 > 2
QauUD =
8>><>>:
L if   2
n
2 if
 > 2
auUD =
8>><>>:
 L
2 if
  2
n2(n2+8)
32 if
 > 2
note: n  L  (the number of consumers at each point of income)
The Open Economy under the UD model
The Post-trade Bertrand Competition
Case 1: Both markets were fully covered under autarky (  2 and   2)
If the income distribution is not diverse in both countries (  2 and   2), and markets in
both countries were fully covered under autarky, as shown in the previous section, the exactly same
quality of goods are produced in two countries. (s = s = )
18 If this is a case, the post trade price
18As noted before,two countries choose the same quality whose cost is the lowest.
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competition between two rms is just the Bertrand competition of homogeneous goods: the price
will be reduced to the marginal cost.
Case 2: Both markets were partially covered under autarky ( > 2 and  > 2) If the
income distribution is diverse enough in both countries,as shown in the previous section, the quality
chosen under autarky depends on the income distribution: the quality of goods produced in the
developed country is higher than that produced in the developing country.19
s =
n2+4
4
s =
n 2+4
4
) s > s if  > 
After the opening of trade, consumers have three choices: they buy one unit of the high quality
goods, buy one unit of the low quality good, or do not buy anything. The marginal consumers,
who are indierent between the low quality good and the high quality one achieve the same utility
if they buy either of two goods by one unit:
s~   p = s~   p
The income of such marginal consumers is
~ =
p  p
s  s
Given the above marginal consumers, aggregate demand of the high quality goods and that of
the low quality ones are derived as follows.20
QUD =
Z 
~
nd QUD =
Z ~

nd
19n = n by assumption
20The denition of marginal consumer's income under the UD model happens to be the same as the denition
under the Non-UD model.
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where  = max
n
; p

s
o
Facing the above aggregate demand, The low-quality goods' rm maximizes the following prot
function.
UD =
Z ~

p n d   F (s) (3.32)
The FOC with respect to p gives the reaction function of The rm producing the low-quality
goods.21
p =
sp
2s
(3.33)
Similarly,the high-quality goods' rm maximizes the following prot function.
UD =
Z 
~
p n d   F (s) (3.34)
The reaction function ofthe high-quality goods' rm is given by the FOC with respect to p:
p =
p
2
+
(s  s) 
2
(3.35)
THe intersection of two reaction functions (3.35), (3.33) gives the equilibrium price after trade:
pUD =
2s(s  s) 
(4s  s) (3.36)
pUD =
s(s  s) 
(4s  s) (3.37)
Substituting the equilibrium prices (3.36), (3.37) back into ~,eq (3.34) and (3.32), we have the
open economy equilibrium under the UD model:
21Again, The low-quality goods' rm maximizes its prots by treating the lower limit  = p

s endogenous variable.
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The income of marginal consumer is given by
~UD =
(2s  s) 
(4s  s) (3.38)
Post-trade prots of two rms are given by
UD =
4s2(s  s)n2
(4s  s)2  
n2 4
32
(3.39)
If the quality dierence between the high quality and the low quality is large enough, [ p

s=
(s s)
(4s s)  
, (4s s) (s s)   0] the market in the developing country will be fully covered after trade,
and prots of The low-quality goods' rm will be
UD =
ns(s  s) s  f(4s  s)   (s  s) g	
(4s  s)2  
n2 4
32
if (4s s) (s s)  0 (3.40)
If the dierence between the high quality and the low quality is not large enough,[ p

s=
(s s)
(4s s) >

,(4s s) (s s)  < 0],the market in the developing country will continue to be partially covered
after trade, and prots of The low-quality goods' rm will be
UD =
nss(s  s) 2
(4s  s)2  
n2 4
32
if (4s s) (s s) < 0 (3.41)
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Appendix B
The Derivation of eq (3.17)
Marginal consumers achieve the same level of CS whether they buy the high quality goods (s) or
the low quality ones (s):
1
2

s~   p
2
=
1
2

s~   p
2
Expanding the above equation, we get

s2   s2

~2   2(sp  sp)~ +

p2   p2

= 0
Solving this quadratic equation, we have two solutions:
~ =
p+ p
s+ s
;
p  p
s  s
Under the rst solution, The low-quality goods' rm faces the upward demand [ @
~
@p > 0 (larger
the market share)], while both rms face the downward demand under the second solutuion. [ @
~
@p <
0 and @
~
@p > 0 (The increase in price results in the loww of the market share)] Thus, the only
economically reasonable solution is the second solution [eq (3.17)].
~ =
p  p
s  s (3:17)
The Derivation of the reaction function of the low-quality goods' rm-eq(3.20)-
After trade, The rm producing the low quality goods maximizes the following reaction function
by treating the lower limit as an endogenous variable = p

s :
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 =
Z ~

p(s   p) nd   F (s) (3:19)
where ~ = p p

s s the upper limit
The FOC with respect to p yields the following quadratic equation:
3s2p2   4ssp + s2p2 = 0
This quadratic equation gives two roots:
p =
sp
3s
;
sp
s
However, the Second Order Condition(SOC) requires that
ns
s(s  s)2 (3sp
   2sp ) < 0
, 3sp   2sp < 0
, p < 2sp3s [SOC]
The only solution that satises the above SOC is the rst root.
p =
sp
3s
(3:20)
The Derivaration of the Open Economy Equilibrium
Substitute the reaction function of The low-quality goods' rm p = s
p
3s [eq(3.20)] into the reaction
function ofthe high-quality goods' rm eq (3.23), we get the following quadratic equation.
(s  2s)
n
27(s  s)2   16s2
o
p2   36s(s  2s)(s  s)2p+ 9s2(s  2s) 2(s  s)2 = 0
If s 6= 2s, the above quadratic equation becomes as follows.
61
n
27(s  s)2   16s2
o
p2   36s(s  s)2p+ 9s2 2(s  s)2 = 0
Solving this quadratic equation, we have two solutions.
p =
3s(s  s) 
n
6s(s  s)2 
p
9(s  s)2 + 16s2
o
27(s  s)2   16s2
Numerical examples show that the positive root solution (p=
3s(s s)

6s(s s)2+
p
9(s s)2+16s2

27(s s)2 16s2 )
is so high thatthe high-quality goods' rm face no demand, and the other negative root solution
always bring higher prots to the rm. Therefore, the solution, which maximizes prots ofthe
high-quality goods' rm is the negative root solution:
p =
3s(s  s) 
n
6s(s  s)2  
p
9(s  s)2 + 16s2
o
27(s  s)2   16s2 (3:24)
The Nash equilibrium price of the low quality products is
p =
sp
3s
=
s 
n
6s(s  s)2  
p
9(s  s)2 + 16s2
o
27(s  s)2   16s2 (3:25)
The income of marginal consumers is
~ =
p  p
s  s =
(3s  s) 
n
6s(s  s)2  
p
9(s  s)2 + 16s2
o
27(s  s)2   16s2 (3:26)
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Chapter 4
Consumer Utility, Vertical Trade, and
the Replacement of Superiors by
Inferiors in the Quality-ladder Model
-Anti-Schumpeterian Results in the Schumpeterian Model-
4.1 Introduction
Innovations improve the quality of goods constantly. In the process of the development, we observe
that high quality goods drive out low quality goods However, in these days, we also observe the
opposite in the developed country: high quality goods in developed countries exit the market,
while lower-quality yet inexpensive imports from developing countries enter the market and attract
consumers in the developed country. It suggests that the new replacement of superiors by inferiors,
where low-quality inexpensive imports drive out high-quality expensive goods produced in the
developed country may be happening now. The question is how and why the new replacement
of superiors by inferiors happens NOW. This paper answers the question by using a resource-
consuming quality ladder model: the innovation of the next highest quality good requires more
resources, while the utility of consumers increase with the product quality at a decreasing rate.
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The concavity of consumer utility plays little role under the autarky, while it becomes important
after trade. Under autarky, a typical Shumpeterian creative destruction takes place: every time a
new highest quality good arrives, the rm producing the lowest quality good exit the market and
the economy devotes more resource to innovate the next highest quality goods, which drives up the
wage. Without trade, only expensive high-quality goods are distributed in the developed country
in the advanced development stage, while only inexpensive lower quality goods are distributed in
the developing country in the early development stage. However, once two countries in dierent
development stages start free trade, consumers, specically the concavity of their utility functions,
and the development stage of the trade partner aect the survival of rms. If the consumer
utility increases with the quality at a mildly decreasing rate (a mild concave utility function),
no replacement of superiors by inferiors will be realized: high-quality products will drive low-
quality products out of the market as Gabszewicz et.al (1981) predict. However, if the consumer
utility increases with the quality at a severely decreasing rate (a severe concave utility function),
the replacement of superiors by inferiors will be realized: low-quality inexpensive goods from the
developing country attract consumers, and rms producing high-quality expensive goods in the
developed country will be extinguished by rms producing low-quality inexpensive goods in the
developing country. Numerical results show that rms from the developing country drive out
all but the rm producing the highest quality good if the developed country start trade with
a least developed country. If the trade partner is a middle-developed country, all rms in the
developed country exit the market and all rms from the middle-developed country survive.(perfect
replacement of superiors by inferiors). For, with a strongly concave utility function, the quality
advantage of rms in the developed country is not large enough to cancel their price disadvantage.
Since consumers receive benet of buying inexpensive imports without downgrading their con-
sumption so much, numerical results show that trading with a middle-developed country improves
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the utility of consumers at any income level more than trading with a least-developed country does
while no producer prefers a middle-developed country as a trade partner.
The basic closed economy model is presented in section 4.2, and the timing of opening trade on
the economy is discussed in section 4.3.
4.2 The Quality Ladder Model
The Economy, Technological Progress and the Labor Market
Consider a closed economy where two sectors produce two types of goods: one sector produces
dierentiated goods (X), and the other sector produces numeraire goods, the composite of ho-
mogeneous consumption goods (Y ). Both sectors produce goods by using labor only. Labor is
mobile between sectors,but labor is immobile between countries. Consumption goods sector (Y ) is
a mature industry,and no new technology will arrive. These consumption goods are produced with
the decreasing returns to scale technology.
F (L) = 2stL
1
2
where st is the technology spillover from the other sector. ( > 0) When a new good of quality
(st) (such as semiconductor,LCD panel, etc ) is invented in the other sector (X), the productivity
of the sector (Y ) will increase. The production function is the neoclassical production function:
F 0Y (LY ) > 0, F
00
Y (LY ) < 0, limLY!0 F
0
Y (LY ) =1, and limLY!1 F 0Y (LY ) = 0.
The sector Y is in the perfect competition, and every rm in the sector maximizes the following
prot function:
Max y = 2stL
1
2   wtL  f
The F.O.C. determines the labor demand of the sector Y .
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LDY =

st
wt
2
(4.1)
The other sector, the vertically dierentiated goods sector, X is a growth sector, and new
technology improves the quality of the product constantly. The process of the technological de-
velopment is exogenous, and the technological progress is the quality-ladder type: the exogenous
innovation arrives constantly and improves the quality of the product at a constant rate . Thus,
the quality of the t-th generation product becomes
st = s0
t
where s0 is the quality of the rst-generation good.
Every vertically dierentiated good is produced with the increasing returns to scale technology
and it maximizes the prot function below:
j = (pj   wt)Qj (Lj)  f 8j 2 X (4.2)
where Qj is the quantity of a vertically dierentiated good j,  > 0 denotes constant marginal
cost, and f is a negligible amount of a small xed cost. The labor requirement for production in
the sector X is given by
LDX =
X
j2X
(Qj) (4.3)
In addition to production, every time the new technology arrives, the growth sector X devotes
labor to introduce the new technology. The labor requirement for introducing the new technology
increases with quality at an increasing rate. Specically, the labor requirement for introducing the
new t-th generation good is given by
LDS =  st (4.4)
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This Equation maps quality to cost in labor units, thus s becomes the index of cost of added
quality. Eq (4.1), (4.3), and (4.4) give the aggregate labor demand in the economy.
LD =

st
wt
2
+ N +  st (4.5)
Where N denotes the number of consumers, who are assumed buy one unit of a vertically
dierentiated good at most.(unit demand) Thus,the total variable cost of producing dierentiated
goods becomes N if every consumer buys a single unit of a dierentiated good. Since the vertically-
dierentiated goods sector requires more labor input to introduce the new good, and the technical
spillover from the sector X to the other sector Y also increases the labor demand, the labor demand
expands every period (Figure 4.1).1
Unlike the labor demand, the labor supply is assumed to be xed in every period. The pop-
ulation size does not change, and all consumers supply their labor endowment inelastically. Each
worker is endowed with dierent skill(labor productivity), and their labor productivity (skill) is
uniformly distributed over the range  2 ;  Thus, the aggregate labor supply in the economy
is constant at
LS =
Z 

 d
=
 
2  2
2
(4.6)
Eq (4.5) and eq (4.6) give us the equilibrium wage per unit of labor productivity (skill).
wt =
str
(+)
2   

N    st
(4.7)
Eq (4.7) implies that a worker(consumer) with skill i earns wti =
stir
(+)
2
 

N  st
when the
economy produces the t  th generation product.
1In every period, the total labor demand in the economy increases by 2st
wt
2

st
st
  wt
wt

+  st
st
st
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Figure 4.1: The Labor Market
Consumers
Except their productivity (and income), all consumers are identical, and they share the same utility
function.
U(x; y) = y1 ux (4.8)
where  > 0 becomes the share of income spent on the dierentiated good. Eq 4.8 shows that
the utility of consumers depends on the consumption of the good Y and the sub-utility ux from the
consumption of good X. The sub-utility increases with the quality of the good X but decreases
with the price. Specically,
ux = wtis

j   pj (4.9)
where s (0<1) is the utility value of s the index of the cost of added quality.  measures the
concavity of utility with respect to quality: the lower the ,the more concave the utility becomes.
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The income of the consumer i, wti enters the sub-utility function (4.9) to reect that high-income
consumers value the quality of products more than low-income consumers do.
Every consumer faces a two-stage game. In the rst stage, each consumer allocates his income
between the vertically dierentiated good X and other consumption goods Y . In the second stage,
he buys at most one unit of a vertically dierentiated good,which maximizes his sub-utility. Thus,
the consumer i's individual demand for the dierentiated good xj is given by
xj =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if wtis

j   pj  wtisk   pk 8k 2 J
0 otherwise
A consumer (~j) is indierent between the good j and the lower-quality good j   1 if and only
if both goods give them the same utility level:
wt~jsj   pj = wt~jsj 1   pj 1
Rearranging the above equation, the skill (the labor productivity) of marginal consumers who
regard the good j and the lower quality good j   1 indierent is given by
~j =
pj   pj 1
wt

sj   sj 1
 (4.10)
Similarly, the skill (the labor productivity) of marginal consumers who regard the good j and
the higher-quality good j + 1 indierent is given by
~j =
pj+1   pj
wt

sj+1   sj
 (4.11)
With the unit-demand assumption, the aggregate demand for the good j, Qj is the number of
consumers with labor productivity  2 [~j ; ~j ]:
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Qj =
h
~j   ~j
i
=
1
wt
 
pj+1   pj
sj+1   sj
  pj   pj 1
sj   sj 1
!
(4.12)
Firms
Each Firm, which produces a vertically dierentiated good with an increasing returns to scale
technology faces a two-stage game. In the rst stage, a new highest-quality good arrives, and every
existing rm decides whether to stay or exit the market. Firms exit the market if and only if their
expected prot in the coming period is negative. In the second stage, all remaining rms join the
Bertrand competition and set prices simultaneously given prices of other rms.
Solving backward, in the second stage of the game, each rm sets the price to maximize the
prot function below. 2
j(Lj) = (pj   wt)
 
pj+1   pj
sj+1   sj
  pj   pj 1
sj   sj 1
!
  f 8j 2 X
Since the technological progress constantly improves the quality of the vertically good xj by
%, we have the F.O.C below.3
pj =
1
2

wt +


 + 1

pj 1 +

1
 + 1

pj+1

(4.13)
The above F.O.C shows that the price depends on the marginal cost wt at time t and the
weighted average of prices of rival rms (strategic complement).4
2This prot function combines the prot function in eq (4.2) with the aggregate demand in eq (4.12).
3The quality of next higher quality good j + 1 is sj+1 = sj
4The weight depends on the quality ladder . The larger the quality dierence , the more weight is put on the
price of lower-quality goods.
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Similarly, the rm producing the highest-quality good faces the exogenous upper bound,the
exogenous highest skill,  and maximizes the prot function below:
max = (pmax   wt)
n
  ~max 1
o
  f
= (pmax   wt)
(
  pmax   pmax 1
smax
 
1  1
 )  f (4.14)
FOC for the rm producing the highest quality good is given by
pmax =
1
2

wt + pmax 1 + smax

1  1


(4.15)
As shown in eq (4.15), the rm producing the highest quality goods raises its price as its
marginal cost, the price of its rival rm, or the quality dierence () increases.
Like the rm producing the highest quality product, the rm producing the lowest quality good
smin may face an exogenous market limit. Its lower bound is the higher of two values: the lowest
skill in the economy  (exogenous variable) or the skill of marginal consumers who are indierent
between buying the lowest-quality good and buying nothing pmin
smin
.

i:e: ~min=max

;
pmin
s

min

The rm
producing the lowest-quality good maximizes its prot as if its lower boundary were endogenous
pmin
smin
.
min = (pmin   wt)
n
~min   ~min
o
  f
= (pmin   wt)
(
pmin+1   pmin
smin+1
 
1  1
   pmin
smin
)
  f (4.16)
FOC for the rm producing the lowest quality good is given by
pmin =
1
2
n
wt +
pmin+1

o
(4.17)
The rm producing the lowest quality goods increases its price with its marginal cost and the
price of its rival rm, but it lowers its price with the quality dierence.
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Above reaction functions, (4.13),(4.15) and (4.17) show that rms compete locally:price of one
rm depends linearly on price(s) of its rival rm(s) producing one lower-quality goods and/or one
higher-quality ones, which is summarized in eq (4.18). 5
26666666666666666666666666664
1  1
2
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 
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1  1
2(+1)
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p1
p2
p3
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...
...
pmax 1
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37777777777777777777777777775
=
26666666666666666666666666666666666666664
wt
2
wt
2
wt
2
wt
2
...
...
wt
2
wt
2 +
s

max(1  1 )
2
37777777777777777777777777777777777777775
(4.18)
The Bertrand equilibrium is the solution of the eq (4.18). For instance, if six dierent-quality
goods, the rst-generation (s1) to the sixth-generation goods (s6), compete in the economy, the
Bertrand equilibrium is given as follows:2666666666666666666666664
p1
p2
p3
p4
p5
p6
3777777777777777777777775
=
wt

266666666666666666664
 fs0 5( 1)+(325+1124+1863+1772+96+24)g
2s

0 
5( 1)+3(164+523+732+52+16)
s

0 
5(42  3)+(564+1723+2222+141+36)
2s

0 
5(43+22 3 3)+3(204+593+732+45+12)
s

0 
5(164+203 32 21 12)+(624+1783+2162+135+36)
2s

0 
5(165+324+153 212 30 12)+3(214+593+722+45+12)
377777777777777777775
5These rms have strategic complementary relationships.
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where  = 644 + 1763 + 2162 + 135 + 36
Closed Economy Equilibrium
The solution to the matrix (4.18) determines the equilibrium price in the economy.6
Once Bertrand Equilibrium prices are determined, prots of each rm (4.2), (4.14), (4.16) is
determined:
j(Lj) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(pmin   wt)

pmin+1 pmin
smin+1(1  1 )
  pmin
smin

  f (4:16) if j = min
(pmax   wt)

  pmax pmax 1
smax(1  1 )

  f (4:14) if j = max
(pj   wt)

pj+1 pj
sj+1 sj
  pj pj 1
sj sj 1

  f (4:2) otherwise
The Equilibrium wage per unit of skill is determined to clear the labor market:
wt =
str
(+)
2   

N    st
(4:7)
Numerical Example in the Closed Economy
This section assigns numerical values to exogenous variables (Table 4.1), and shows how the tech-
nological progress replaces obsolete goods with new higher quality goods (Shumpeterian creative
destruction), while the resource-consuming technological progress drives up the labor demand and
wage.
6Of course, the number of rms in the equilibrium is determined by exogenous variables such as the distribution
of skill, the quality ladder , other parameters such as consumers' quality discount parameter .
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 = 1:2 Every innovation improves the highest quality goods by 20 %
s0 = 10
Quality of the rst-generation good s0 is 10.
Thus,the quality of the t-th generation goods st = s0
t = 10(1:2)t
 2 [50; 700]
Lowest productivity is  = 50 and the highest one is  = 700
Labor productivity of a worker is uniformly distributed over the range.
 = 1
One unit of labor input produces one unit of any vertically dierentiated good.
The marginal cost of any dierentiated good= wt
 = 0:2
Income of individuals (wti) is scaled down to (0:2wti)
and mapped to the utility value of the added quality.
 = 0:002
Consumer Utility level w.r.t quality is strictly concave sj = s
0:002
j
the utility value of added quality decreases at an increasing rate.
 = 10
Technological progress in the X sector
improves the productivity in the Y sector by st = 10st;
 = 30 The labor requirement for developing the next highest quality good is  st = 30st
Table 4.1: Exogenous Variables in the Numerical Example
Without trade, as shown in table 4.2, the competition for higher quality escalates, and the
Shumpeterian creative destruction repeats within a country. During the repetition of the Shum-
peterian creative destructions, more and more labor force is devoted to both sectors, and the wage
level increases more and more. As a result, only expensive and high-quality goods survive in the
developed country. On the other hand, the developing country in the early development stage
has not devoted much labor resource into the improvement in quality yet, and accordingly only
low-quality yet inexpensive goods are distributed.
Table 4.2 shows the variety of goods available in the economy, prices of these goods, the market
share of these goods at each stage of technological progress.
For instance, when the highest quality good in a country is s5 = s0
5 (the third row in Table
4.2), the wage rate w5 = 0:505 (=the marginal cost), three products s3; s4; and s5 are distributed in
the economy, lower quality goods s2 has just exited the market, and even lower quality goods s1 have
already exited it. The lowest quality good in the economy s3 is sold to consumers in  2 [50; 60:4]
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at the price p3 = 0:508. The utility of these consumers ranges from ux 2 [4:576; 5:633], while
the producer of s3 earns 3 = 0:03. The second lowest quality good in the economy s4 is sold
to consumers in  2 [60:4; 292:1] at the price p4 = 0:510. The utility of these consumers ranges
from ux 2 [5:633; 29:200], while the producer of s4 earns 4 = 1:16.The highest quality good in the
economy s5 is sold to high-end consumers in  2 [292:1; 700] at the price p5 = 0:521. The utility of
these consumers ranges from ux 2 [29:20; 70:70], while the producer of s5 earns the highest prots
among three rms 5 = 6:53.
As shown in Table 4.2, without trade, the quality competition among domestic rms will lead
to Schumpeterian creative destructions. Every time the new highest-quality good arrives in an
economy, the lowest-quality good in the economy exits the market.(In the particular numerical
example, in every period, only top 3 goods survive in the economy.) As innovation improves the
product quality, it uses more resources, improve labor productivity, and drives up wage. As a result,
in a developed country in an advanced development stage, its wage level is high and only expensive
high-quality goods survive in the market. A developed country in the advanced development stage,
t = 30 for instance, only three expensive high quality goods s28(p28 = 57:49), s29(p29 = 57:75), and
s30(p30 = 58:98) survive, and the wage rate is high w30 = 57:3. On the contrary, in a developing
country in the early development stage, t = 5 for instance, the wage level is low (w5 = 0:51)
and only inexpensive low-quality goods [s3(p3 = 0:508), s4(p4 = 0:510), and s5(p5 = 0:521)] are
distributed in the country.
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Stage
t w Surviving Firms
3
w3
s1: market coverage  2 [50; 60:4] s2 : 2[60:4;292:1] s3 : 2[292:1;700]
p1 1
Consumer
Utility p2 2
Consumer
Utility p3 3
Consumer
Utility
0:35 0:352 0:02 ux2[3;4] 0:354 0:93 ux2[4;20] 0:361 4:49 ux2[20;49]
4
w4
s2: market coverage  2 [50; 60:4] s3 : 2[60:4;292:1] s4 : 2[292:1;700]
p2 2
Consumer
Utility p3 3
Consumer
Utility p4 4
Consumer
Utility
0:42 0:423 0:02 ux2[4;5] 0:425 0:93 ux2[5;24] 0:434 5:30 ux2[24;59]
5
w5
s3: market coverage  2 [50; 60:4] s4 : 2[60:4;292:1] s5 : 2[292:1;700]
p3 3
Consumer
Utility p4 4
Consumer
Utility p5 5
Consumer
Utility
0:505 0:508 0:03 ux2[5;6] 0:510 1:16 ux2[6;29] 0:521 6:53 ux2[29;71]
  
10
w10
s8: market coverage  2 [50; 60:4] s9 : 2[60:4;292:1] s10 : 2[292:1;700]
p8 8
Consumer
Utility p9 9
Consumer
Utility p10 10
Consumer
Utility
1:26 1:266 0:05 ux2[11;14] 1:27 2:31 ux2[14;73] 1:299 15:5 ux2[73;177]
20
w20
s18: market coverage  2 [50; 60:4] s19 : 2[60:4;292:1] s20 : 2[292:1;700]
p18 18
Consumer
Utility p19 19
Consumer
Utility p20 20
Consumer
Utility
7:97 7:999 0:34 ux2[73;89] 8:035 16:00 ux2[89;463] 8:207 98:30 ux2[463;1120]
28
w28
s26: market coverage  2 [50; 60:4] s27 : 2[60:4;292:1] s28 : 2[292:1;700]
p26 26
Consumer
Utility p27 27
Consumer
Utility p28 28
Consumer
Utility
37:5 37:61 1:6 ux2[342;421] 37:78 74:4 ux2[421;2183] 38:59 461:3 ux2[2183;5284]
30
w30
s28: market coverage  2 [50; 60:4] s29 : 2[60:4;292:1] s30 : 2[292:1;700]
p28 28
Consumer
Utility p29 29
Consumer
Utility p30 30
Consumer
Utility
57:3 57:49 2:4 ux2[524;644] 57:75 113:8 ux2[644;3338] 58:98 705:3 ux2[3338;8082]
Table 4.2: Closed Economy Equilibrium
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4.3 The Open Economy
Suppose that two countries start free trade. These two countries are exactly the same except their
development stage. The stage of development denes the least-developed, the middle-developed,
and the developed county. One country (home) is the developed country in the advanced devel-
opment stage, and only high-quality and expensive goods survive in the market. On the contrary,
the other country (foreign) is the least-developed country (the middle-developed country) in the
early development (the middle development) stage, and accordingly only low-quality yet inexpen-
sive goods are distributed in the market. The dierence in technological development stages results
in the dierence in wage (w;w), income (w;w), and the marginal cost, which aects all rms
in the same country(w; w). Except the stage of the technological development, two countries
are the same :both countries have the same production technology (one unit of any dierentiated
good is produced with one unit of labor input. That is,  = 1), the population size in two countries
are the same N = N, the skill of workers (productivity) are uniformly distributed over the same
range  2 [; ];  2 [; ],and consumers(workers) share the same utility function.
Although trade oers consumers a wider variety of goods, consumer's problem does not change
after the opening of trade. To maximize his sub-utility (4.9), each consumer chooses the best
dierentiated good from whatever available in the market and buys at most one unit of the good.
xj =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if wtis

j   pj  wtisk   pk 8k 2 J
0 otherwise
As in autarky (4.10), (4.11), marginal consumers, who are indierent between the good j and
another good k (k < j) are dened as follows:
The lower/upper limit between any two rms (j > k)
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~j;k =
pj   pk
sj   sk
(4:10); (4:11)
The lower limit for the rm producing the lowest quality becomes
~min = min

;
pmin
smin

(4.19)
The upper limit for the rm producing the highest quality is the highest skill in the economy.
~max =  (4.20)
It should be noted that the rm j faces zero demand if any one of the following condition holds.
1. The quality of the good chosen by the lowest-income consumers is higher than that of the
good j. Thus, the upper limit of the rm j is lower than the skill of the lowest-income
consumers in the economy
~j;j+1 <  [Zero demand condition 1]
2. The goods chosen by the highest-income consumers is lower than the good j. Thus, the lower
limit of rm j is higher than the highest productivity in the economy
 < ~j 1;j [Zero demand condition 2]
3. The good j will never be the most preferred good to anyone. (as shown in Figure 4.2) No
consumer prefers the good j to the lower quality good j   1 or the higher quality good j +1.
Thus, the lower limit of the higher quality good j+1 overtakes the lower limit of the good j,
and the location of the lower limit of the higher quality good j + 1 is lower than that of the
good j.
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~j 1;j+1 < ~j 1;j [Zero demand condition 3]
j-1 > j >j+1 j+1> j-1 >j  j+1 > j >j-1 
buy the good j-1 buy the good j+1 buy the good j+1
θ j-1, j+1 θ j-1, j
Figure 4.2: Zero Demand Condition 3
Once free trade starts, rms can sell their products in their home market and/or the foreign
market. No arbitrage can work between domestic and foreign markets, thus the price discrimination
is possible. Since this paper focuses on the market in the developed country, the following sections
discuss the developed country only.
The game after trade is basically the same as that under autarky. In the rst stage, each rm
decides whether or not join the competition in the domestic market and/or the foreign market.
A rm will exit the market if no consumer buys its products even if it discounts its price to the
marginal cost. (wt for the developed country and w

t for the developing country) In the second
stage, all rms in the market join the Bertrand competition.
Suppose that before free trade starts, k + 1 varieties of vertically dierentiated goods (j =
0; 1; : : : ; k) are distributed in each country. 7 If all rms join the Bertrand competition after trade,
rms from the developing country maximize the following prot function in the developed country
market.
7s = st k; st (k 1); : : : st s
 = st k; s

t (k 1); : : : s

t
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Prot functions of rms from the developing country
j =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:

pj   wt
n
~j;j+1   ~j
o
  f (4:16) if j = t   k

pj   wt
n
~j;j+1   ~j 1;j
o
  f (4:2) if j =t k+1;t k+2;:::t
Prot functions of rms from the developed country
j =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
(pj   wt)
n
~j;j+1   ~j 1;j
o
  f (4:2) if j =t k;t k+1;:::t 1
(pj   wt)
n
~  ~j 1;j
o
  f (4:14) if j = t
where ~; ~ are the skill (productivity) of marginal consumers, derived from (4.10),(4.19),(4.11)and
(4.20).
Dierentiating the above prot functions with respect to its price, we have the FOCs:
pj =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
1
2
n
wt +
pj+1

o
(4:17) if j =t k
1
2
n
wt +


+1

pj 1 +

1
+1

pj+1
o
(4:13) if j =t k+1;t k+2;:::t 1
1
2
n
wt + 


 1
(+1) 1

pt 1 +

 1
(+1) 1

pt k
o
(4:21) if j = t
where   (t   k)   t denotes the dierence in quality between the lowest quality good in the
80
developed country and the highest quality good in the developing country.89
pj =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
1
2
n
wt + 


 1
(+1) 1

pt +

 1
(+1) 1

pt k+1
o
(4:22) if j = t  k
1
2
n
wt +


+1

pj 1 +

1
+1

pj
o
(4:13) if j =t k+1;t k+2;:::t 1
1
2

wt + pt 1 + s

t
 
1  1
	
(4:15) if j = t
The open economy Bertrand equilibrium is the solution of linear relationship among rms in
the market (4.17)*,(4.13)*,(4.13),(4.21),(4.22),and (4.15)
8
pt =
1
2

wt + 


   1
(+1)   1

pt 1 +

   1
(+1)   1

pt k

 (4.21)
9
pt k =
1
2

wt + 


   1
(+1)   1

pt +

   1
(+1)   1

pt k+1

(4.22)
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(4.23)
where 
  s

h(1  1 ) 
2 and   t k f the quality dierence between the highest quality good
in the developed country and the lowest quality good in the developing country.
Numerical Examples in an Open Economy: Replacement of Superiors by Inferi-
ors
Consider a developed country, where the 30-th generation good has been invented and a least de-
veloped country, where the 5-th generation product has just been invented (a middle developed
country, where the 13-th generation product has invented), start free trade. Using the same ex-
ogenous values (Table 4.1) as those used in the previous section,the 3rd, the 4th, and the 5th
generation goods are in the least developed country (the 11-th, the 12-th, and the 13-th generation
goods are in the middle developed country), and the 28th, the 29th and the 30th generation goods
are in the developed country.
This section focuses the market in the developed country and numerically shows that the re-
placement of superiors by inferiors will actually happen if the utility function of consumers is strictly
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concave with respect to quality and the utility value of the added quality decreases at an increasing
rate. Whether or not all rms in the developed country are extinguished by rms from the devel-
oping country depends on the trade partner. If the utility gain of the added quality decreases at
an increasing rate (strictly concave utility function), and the trade partner is the least developed
country in the very early development stage, only the producer of the highest quality good in the
developed country barely survives. However, all rms in the developed country exit the market if
the utility function of consumers is strictly concave and the trade partner is the middle developed
country in the middle development stage. Numerical results also show that all consumers prefer
the middle developed country as a trade partner to the least developed country, while no rm in
the developed country prefer the middle developed country as a trade partner.
Baseline Case: Mildly Concave Utility Function  = 0:4, s = s0:4 and Trade with a
Least Developed Country t = 5
First, as a benchmark case, this section discusses the case, where the utility gain of the added
quality decreases at a moderate increasing rate and the utility function of consumers is mildly
concave. Immediately after the opening of trade, six varieties of goods (s3; s4; s5; s28; s29; s30)
are in the developed country. If all of these six rms compete in the developed country, the Bertrand
competition will determine the market coverage of each rm (the location of marginal consumers)
shown in the upper half of the Table 4.3. As shown, if the utility of consumers increases with the
quality at a mildly decreasing rate (the utility gain of consumers decreases at a mildly increasing
rate), the location of marginal consumers of all rms from the developing country is lower than
the lowest income in the developed country. That is, all three rms of the developing country face
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zero demand. 10 Even if all these three rms in the developing country set their prices at their
marginal cost wt , the lowest income of consumers who choose their products are lower than the
lowest income in the developed country and rms of the developing country still face zero demand
as shown in the bottom half of the Table 4.3. As a result, no rm in the developing country will
enter the developed country market in the rst stage of the game.
Mildly Concave Utility Function  = 0:4: t = 5; t = 30
~3;4 ~4;5 ~5;28 ~28;29 ~29;30
  49:5   47:8   44:7  + 14:8  + 244:6
Mildly Concave Utility  = 0:4: t = 5; t = 30
s3; s4; and s5 are sold at its marginal cost wt
~3;4 ~4;5 ~5;28 ~28;29 ~29;30
- -   44:6  + 14:8  + 244:6
Table 4.3: The Location of Marginal Consumers in a Mildly Concave Utility Function Case
Since there is no entry from the developing country, no change will be brought to the developed
country after trade. All three rms in the developed country will not change their prices after
trade, maintain the same market share, as shown in Table 4.2. In this case, Schumpeterian creative
destructions in the developed country will be repeated forever.
Case of Strictly Concave Utility Function:  = 0:002, s = s0:002
Suppose that the utility function of consumers is strictly concave and the quality of a product
increases the utility of consumers at a rapidly decreasing rate. This section shows the strictly
10As shown in the upper half of the Table 4.3, the location of marginal consumers for rms in the developing
country are below the lowest labor productivity .
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concave utility function of consumers will cause an anti-Schumpeterian creative destruction, the
replacement of superiors by inferiors if two countries in dierent development stages start trade.
Numerical examples show that low-quality inexpensive goods from the developing country will
extinguish some or all of high-quality expensive goods in the developed country. How many high-
quality goods in the developed country survive after the start of trade depends on the trading
partner. This section uses numerical example and shows that if the trade partner is a least developed
country in the early development stage(s  12), the highest quality good (s30) will barely survive
but other two goods in the developed country exit the market. If the trade partner is change to in
the middle developed country in the middle development stage (s > 12), the quality advantage of
goods produced in the developed country is not sucient enough to cover the price disadvantage,
and all goods produced in the developed country are extinguished by lower quality goods produced
in the developing country, and Schumpeterian creative destructions will nally stop in the developed
country.
Case 1: Strictly Concave Utility Function  = 0:002 and Trade with a Least Developed
Country: t  12
Given that the utility function of consumers is strictly concave with respect to the quality of
products (s0:002), two countries, a developed country in the advanced development stage (t =
30) and a developing country in the early development stage (t = 5) start trade. If six rms
(s3; s4; s5; s28; s29; s30) join the Bertrand competition, as the upper half of Table 4.4 shows, two
producers of the lowest and the second lowest quality goods in the developed country (s28; s29) and
a producer of the lowest quality good in the developing country (s3) face zero demand: the Zero
Demand Condition 3 holds for two rms in the developed country (s28; s29) and the Zero Demand
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Condition 1 holds for a rm in the developing country (s3), and thus they face zero demand.11 If
the rm in the developing country s3 sets its own marginal cost wt , as shown in the bottom of
Table 4.4, the highest income of consumers, who buys s3 is higher than the lowest income in the
developed country, which means that it will now face positive demand. However, other two rms
in the developed country (s28; s29) will still face zero demand even if they set their prices at their
own marginal cost wt, which is much higher than the marginal cost in the developing country.
12.
Thus, when two countries, a developed country in an advanced development stage (t = 30) and
a least developed country in an early development stage (t = 5) start trade, two rms producing
relatively high-quality goods (s28 and s29) in the developed country will exit the market in the
rst stage of the game. As a result, in this case, free trade will polarize goods in the market:three
rms producing low quality goods in the developing country (s3; s4; s5) and one rm producing the
highest quality good in the developed country (s30) will survive and join the Bertrand competition
in the second stage.
Strictly Concave Utility  = 0:002: t = 5; t = 30
~3;4 ~4;5 ~5;28 ~5;29 ~5;30
  4:5  + 177:4  + 509:4  + 498:1  + 489:6
Strictly Concave Utility  = 0:02: t = 5; t = 30
s3; s28; and s29 are sold at its marginal cost wt or wt
~3;4 ~4;5 ~5;28 ~5;29 ~5;30
+ 26:4  + 179:2 -  + 497:5  + 489:6
Table 4.4: The Location of Marginal Consumers in the Strictly Concave Utility Function Case
The Bertrand equilibrium in this case is shown in Table 4.5. Since rms producing similar
11s28; and s29 face zero demand if ~5;28 > ~5;29 and ~5;29 > ~5;30.
12Again, the Zero Demand Condition 3 holds for s29: ~5;29 > ~5;30
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quality goods in the developed country (s28; s29) will exit the market after trade, the rm producing
the highest quality good in the developed country (s30) will raise its price (p30 = 58:98 ! p30 =
66:54). That is because, the opening of trade drives similar quality goods out, and its product is
more dierentiated from other goods. (s3; s4; ands5) Due to the price increase, the rm s30 will
lose a part of its market share ( 2 [292:1; 700] !  2 [612:0; 700]). Nevertheless, the increase in
the prot margin overwhelms the decrease in the market share, and its prot 30 will increase after
trade. ( 30 = 705:3 ! 30 = 817 )
Strictly Concave Utility Function and Least Developed Trading Partner
 = 0:002; t = 5; t = 30
Firm Exit: Two Domestic Firms: s28 and s29
Surviving Firms: Three Foreign Firms s3; s4; s5 & One Domestic Firm s30
s3: market coverage  2 [ = 50; 85:5] s4: 2[85:5;256:3] s5: 2[256:3;612:0] s30: 2[612:0;700:0]
p3 

3 p

4 

4 p

5 

5 p30 30
0:505
(0:508)
0
(0:03)
0:86
(0:510)
148
(1:16)
1:94
(0:521)
490
(6:53)
66:54
(58:98)
817
(705:3)
Table 4.5: Strictly Concave Utility & Trade with the Least Developed Country: Bertrand Equilibrium
( ) shows autarky prices or prots.
On one hand, as shown above, all rms surviving in the developed country will gain prot
after trade. On the other hand, not all consumers in the developed country will improve their
utility after trade. Figure 4.3 shows the change in the consumer utility after trade. The consumer
utility will improve for majority of consumers  2 [ = 50; 540:47]. These consumers will improve
their utility by buying lower-quality imports at lower prices. However, consumers of the high
income (productivity)  2 [540:47; 700] will be hurt after trade: some high-income consumers
 2 [540:47; 612:05] will be hurt by downgrading their consumption (s30 to s5). Other high-income
consumers  2 [612:05; 700] will be hurt by the price increase (p30).
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θ 
Skill
Utility Change:  Ux,TRADE-Ux,AU
Ux,TRADE-Ux,AU
540.47 612.05292.10
100 200 300 400 500 600 700
10
0
10
20
30
40
50
Figure 4.3: Case 1: Strictly Concave Utility  = 0:02 and Trade with the Least Developed Country
t = 5
Case 2: Strictly Concave Utility Function  = 0:02 and Trade with a Middle Developed
Country: t > 12 Next, let's change the trading partner from the least developed country
(t = 5) to a middle developed country in the middle development stage (t = 13). If all six
rms (s11; s12; s13; s28; s29; s30) stay in the market, as the upper table in table 4.6 shows, the lowest
income of consumers, who buy high-quality goods in the developed country is higher than the
highest income in the developed country, which means that all rms in the developed country will
face zero demand. 13
If all rms in the developed country s28; s29; and s30 set their marginal cost wt, as shown
in the bottom of Table 4.6, even the highest income consumers in the developed country prefer
lower quality goods from the middle-developed country, and producers in the developed country
still face zero demand. (The location of marginal consumers who are indierent between s13 and
13the Zero Demand Condition 3 holds for two rms in the developed country (s28; s29) ~13;28 > ~13;29 and ~13;29 >
~13;30 and the Zero Demand Condition 2 holds for the rm producing the highest quality good ~13;30 > .
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s30) exceeds the highest skill  in the developed country.
14
Thus, if the utility of consumers increases with quality at a rapidly decreasing rate  = 0:002,
and the trade partner is in the middle development stage t  13, all rms in the developed country
will be extinguished by rms in the developing country. In this case, the perfect replacement of
superiors by inferiors will be realized, and nally, the Schumpeterian creative destructions will stop
in the developed country.
Strictly Concave Utility  = 0:002 & Trade with the Middle Developed Country t = 13; t = 30
~3;4 ~4;5 ~5;28 ~5;29 ~5;30
+ 15:2  + 275:6  + 111:7  + 85  + 59:7
Strictly Concave Utility t  = 0:002 & Trade with the Middle Developed Country t = 13; t = 30
s28; s29 and s30 are sold at its marginal cost wt
~3;4 ~4;5 ~5;28 ~5;29 ~5;30
+ 9:9  + 248:9 - -  + 41:7
Table 4.6: The Location of Marginal Consumers
The actual Bertrand competition in the second stage of the game will be done by three rms from
the developing country, and the equilibrium in the developed country is shown in Table 4.7. As the
table shows, facing high-income consumers without any developed country rms, three developing
country rms(s11; s12; s13) set higher price and earn higher prot in the developed country than
they do in its own country.
Figure 4.4 (solid line) shows the change in consumer utility in the developed country. Since
all high-quality goods in the developed country will be replaced by lower quality goods from the
country in the middle development stage, all consumers in the developed country will downgrade
14Zero Demand Condition 2 holds for s30.
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their consumption. As in the previous case(Figure 4.3), the majority of consumers ( 2 [50; 482:6])
will improve their utility after trade, while some high-income consumers ( 2 [482:6; 700]) will
be hurt by downgrading their consumption. Comparing the middle developed country (solid line
in Figure 4.4) with the least developed country (dashed line), Figure 4.4 clearly shows that at
every income level, trade with the middle developed country brings more benet to consumers
than that with the least developed country does. If the developed country trades with the least
developed country, some high-income consumers will be hurt by downgrading their consumption
from the highest quality goods to inexpensive but much lower-quality imports, and other high-
income consumers will be hurt by the increase in the price of the highest quality goods. However,
if the developed country trade with the middle-developed country,high-income consumers will not
have to downgrade their consumption so much, and accordingly all consumers will benet from
inexpensive imports. As shown, consumers at any income level prefer trade with the middle-
developed country, while rms prefer trade with the least-developed country. The overall eect
of trade is summarized in Table 4.8. Trade improves the aggregate consumer surplus at the cost
of producers. If the developed country trades with the middle developed country, all rms in
the developed country will exit the market, while all consumers will improve their utility. If the
developed country trades with the least developing country, some consumers will be hurt by the
downgrade of their consumption, but the aggregate consumer surplus will improve and the rm
producing the highest quality good in the developed country will survive.
4.4 Conclusion
This paper focuses the trade-o between the utility gain from the improvement of quality and the
cost of the improvement and answers how and why high-quality expensive goods in the developed
country are replaced by low-quality inexpensive goods from the developing country in the quality-
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Strictly Concave Utility and Trade with the Middle Developed Country
 = 0:002; t = 13; t = 30
Firm Exit: Three Domestic Firms: s28, s29 and s30
Surviving Firms: Three Foreign Firms s11; s12; s13
s11: market coverage  2 [ = 50; 58:4] s12: 2[58:4;291:7] s13: 2[291:7;700]
p11 

11 ux p

12 

12 ux p

13 

13 ux
2:43
(2:19)
20
(0:09) [575:08;672:57]
2:68
(2:20)
625
(4:31) [672:57;3367:7]
3:91
(2:25)
1596
(26:75) [3367:7;8087:1]
Table 4.7: Strictly Concave Utility Function & Trade with the Middle Developed Country: Bertrand
Equilibrium
( ) shows prices or prots in the developing country market.
Producer Surplus
28+29+30
Consumuer Surplus
ux
Autarky 821:5 2:784 106
Trade with a
Least Developed
Country 813 2:808 106
Trade with a
Middle Developed
Country 0 2:815 106
Table 4.8: Producer Surplus, Consumer Surplus in the Developed Country
ladder model. Under a closed economy, all rms use the same domestic labor force and share the
same cost, the cost of the added quality is reected equally in home goods, and thus the concavity
of utility function plays no role under trade. Without trade, the Schumpeterian creative destruction
repeats: every time a new highest quality good arrives, the arrival dives the lowest quality good out
and the resource-consuming technological progress will drive up the wage and the marginal cost in
the country. As a result, only high-quality expensive goods survive in the developed country, while
low-quality inexpensive goods are distributed in the developing country.
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Utility Change:  Ux,TRADE-Ux,AU
Ux,TRADE-Ux,AU
θ 
Productivity
Trade with LDC
Trade with MDC
100 200 300 400 500 600 700
0
Figure 4.4: Utility Change: Strictly Concave Utility and Trade with the Middle Developed Country
However, once two countries in dierent development stages start free trade, low-quality in-
expensive goods,which reect low cost of the added quality in the developing country as well as
high-quality expensive goods, which reect high cost of the added quality in the developed country
are available in the market. In such a case, the concavity of the consumer utility function plays
an important role. If the consumer utility increases with the quality at mildly decreasing rate and
the utility value of the added quality always exceed the cost of it, no replacement of superiors
by inferiors will be realized, and Schumpeterian creative destruction will repeat forever. However,
if the utility of consumers increases the quality of products at a rapidly decreasing rate and the
cost of the added quality exceeds the utility value of the added quality, the quality advantage of
goods in the developed country is not large enough to make up the dierence in price. As a result,
low-quality inexpensive goods from the developing country drive out high-quality expensive goods
in the developed country. Recently, such a phenomenon is actually reported in the developed
country. For instance, in April 2012, Aquascutum,a UK-based luxury clothing manufacturer,was
sold to YGM Trading, a Chinese fashion retailer.
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Numerical results show that only the rm producing the highest quality good in the developed
country barely survives if the trade partner is the least-developed country, while all rms in the
developed country exit the market (the perfect replacement of superiors by inferiors) if the trade
partner is the middle-developed country.
For consumers,trade with the middle-developed country is more preferable. If the country trade
with the middle-developed country, consumers will not downgrade their consumption so much, and
accordingly the benet of buying inexpensive imports outweighs the damage from downgrading
their consumption for the majority of consumers.
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